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Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Experiences learned from the use of resident auditors at peacekeeping missions

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/241 of 23 December 1999, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report on the experiences gained in the use of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions and the implications of the formula proposed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to determine the optimum number and salary level of resident auditors that should be deployed to each mission.

The main concept behind resident auditors, who are OIOS staff members deployed to missions but who report to the Director, Audit and Management Consulting Division, of OIOS, is that their continuous physical presence in peacekeeping missions would: (a) provide reasonable assurance to management that the established internal controls are functioning effectively; (b) provide an additional deterrent against the possibility of mismanagement, waste, abuse or fraud in high-risk missions; (c) enable OIOS to gain more in-depth knowledge of mission operations and thereby to be better prepared and able to react promptly to "audit-worthy" events as they develop; and (d) facilitate the process through which OIOS identifies and provides management with advice on significant problem areas.

OIOS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations agree that the practice of employing resident auditors in selected peacekeeping missions has been very useful and should be continued. During the period from 1994 to 1999, 15 resident auditors were deployed in 10 missions, serving a total of 209 staff-months. Their work resulted in the issuance of more than 1,500 recommendations, which have enjoyed a high rate — better than 80 per cent — of acceptance and implementation by management. Among other corrective actions, these recommendations called for the

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recovery of fraud-related and other overpayments amounting to $9.5 million and the adoption of various cost-saving or income-enhancement measures amounting to an additional $9.3 million. Other recommendations called for the installation of stronger internal controls and other improvements meant to ensure the quality of administrative and logistical support operations, as well as the efficient and effective use of mission resources.

The audit and consulting services provided by resident auditors have had positive reactions from the heads and other officials of the missions concerned, who have expressed their satisfaction for such services, regarding them as a necessary and valuable complement to the internal oversight function normally provided by OIOS.

The use of resident auditors presents a number of challenges, including identifying and recruiting qualified candidates; ensuring that the appointed candidates subsequently receive the required training and exposure to best auditing practices; ensuring that the resident auditors maintain an effective working relationship with mission management without, at the same time, compromising their independence; and assisting and motivating the resident auditors to perform effectively — and to serve on a relatively long-term basis — despite the special pressures and other problems posed by the difficult and often harsh mission environment.

To ensure adequate internal audit coverage of mission operations, OIOS has recommended that a resident auditor at the P-4 or P-3 level be assigned for each $100 million of annual budgeted expenditure and also, for those missions with annual budgets exceeding $200 million, that an auditing assistant at the G-6 or G-7 level be assigned. This recommendation was endorsed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. OIOS is also proposing that the resident audit teams in the large missions, namely, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), be headed by resident auditors at the P-5 level in view of the complexity of the operations to be covered. This is in line with what the Advisory Committee supported for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

As at 31 December 2000, 13 resident auditor posts and three auditing assistant posts had been authorized in six peacekeeping missions (UNMIK, UNAMSIL, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea). If the OIOS formula were fully implemented, it would result in:

(a) The inclusion of one additional mission (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) under the resident auditor arrangement;

(b) The establishment of up to five additional resident auditor posts at the P-5, P-4 or P-3 level and one auditing assistant post at the G-7 or G-6 level.

The actual recruitment and deployment of any additional resident auditors will be made only after OIOS makes a detailed assessment of the risks and corresponding audit requirements pertaining to each affected mission.

The work of the resident auditors becomes even more important in the light of the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), which provide for greater delegation of administrative authority to peacekeeping missions.

The Secretary-General supports the practice of deployment of OIOS resident auditors to the major peacekeeping operations based on the criteria described above.

Contents

		Paragraphs	*Page*
	Abbreviations		5
I.	Introduction	1–2	6
II.	The resident auditor arrangement: origin, purpose and terms of reference	3–7	6
III.	Experience learned from the use of resident auditors	8–16	7
IV.	Determination of the number and salary levels of resident auditors	17–21	9
V.	Challenges in the use of resident auditors	22–26	10
VI.	Conclusion	27	12

Abbreviations

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	United Nations Observation Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPF	United Nations Peace Forces
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTOFY	United Nations Transition Office in the Former Yugoslavia

I. Introduction

1. Following its consideration of the reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone (A/53/454/Add.1, A/54/455 and A/54/633) and of the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/54/647), the General Assembly, by its resolution 54/241 of 23 December 1999, requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the experience gained in the use of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions and the implications of the implementation of a formula recommended by OIOS to determine the number and salary levels of resident auditors deployed to peacekeeping missions.

2. The present report has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/241 and is based in large part on a related review conducted by OIOS in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The review covered the employment and results of the work of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions during the five-year period from 1994 to 1999, as well as the feedback received from the Department and the heads and other officers of the missions concerned on the impact and other aspects of the resident auditors' performance.

II. The resident auditor arrangement: origin, purpose and terms of reference

3. The sudden and explosive growth in the number and cost of peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s posed substantial difficulties and challenges to the Organization. United Nations peacekeeping expenditures increased dramatically, from $819 million in the biennium 1990-1991 to $4.7 billion in 1992-1993. For OIOS, the main challenge was to determine what special steps, if any, it should take to meet its objective of providing those operations with adequate and effective internal audit coverage. This led the Office to consider reviving the practice, initiated by the former Internal Audit Division in the mid-1970s, of stationing auditors permanently in selected missions. Such "resident auditors" are audit staff deployed to a mission who report to the Director, Audit and Management Consulting Division, of OIOS. The first missions to which resident auditors were assigned were UNEF II, from September 1975 to October 1976, and UNIFIL, from February 1980 to June 1987. The resident auditor in UNIFIL also covered UNDOF.

4. After carefully reviewing the resident auditor arrangement involving UNEF and UNIFIL, OIOS concluded that a similar arrangement would be beneficial with regard to the peacekeeping missions established since the early 1990s, particularly those with the largest personnel components and expenditure budgets. As the UNEF and UNIFIL experience indicated, the continuous physical presence of a resident auditor in a mission area has served and would continue to serve the following purposes:

(a) To provide reasonable assurance to management that the established internal controls were functioning effectively;

(b) To provide an additional deterrent against the possibility of mismanagement, waste, abuse or fraud;

(c) To enable OIOS, through each resident auditor, to gain a more extensive and in-depth knowledge of mission operations and to be better prepared and able to react more promptly to events that required speedy audit attention;

(d) To facilitate the audit process of identifying significant problem areas in the missions and of providing appropriate advice and recommendations for their effective resolution.

5. In each case, the decision to field a resident auditor is made by OIOS in consultation and agreement with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the mission concerned. Depending on the size and volume of operations of the mission, among other factors, resident auditor posts — which have formed part of the mission's staffing table — have been established at the P-4 or P-3 level. The resident auditor's work has been guided in part by written terms of reference developed by OIOS in cooperation with the Department. Further guidance and close supervision have been provided by the Audit and Management Consulting Division at Headquarters.

6. The resident auditors' terms of reference call for them:

(a) To examine and evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls and suggest measures for strengthening them;

(b) To conduct planned audits, either alone or with visiting OIOS audit teams from Headquarters;

(c) To respond to day-to-day requests from managers at all levels for special audits or for advice and assistance in such matters as the interpretation of United Nations staff and financial regulations, rules and related directives and the formulation of guidelines for local issuance;

(d) To provide relevant briefings to and otherwise assist visiting external auditors in conducting their audit of the host mission, and to help ensure coordination and prevent or minimize duplication of audit coverage;

(e) To provide information to the OIOS Investigations Section on matters pertaining to allegations or cases of fraud, presumptive fraud or other serious irregularities in the mission area.

7. The results of the resident auditor's audits are normally communicated to the mission's chief of administration through individual audit observations issued under the auditor's name after being cleared by the Peacekeeping Section of the Audit and Management Consulting Division. Resident audit findings and recommendations that deal with policy issues and other significant matters requiring the attention of United Nations Headquarters are normally communicated to the appropriate officials at Headquarters through memorandums or reports signed by the Director of the Division.

III. Experience learned from the use of resident auditors

8. A review conducted by OIOS of their employment and performance during the five-year period from 1994 to 1999 showed that the practice of using resident auditors in large peacekeeping missions has proven to be very useful and should be continued. Resident auditors have played an important role in improving the internal control systems in peacekeeping missions, and their audit findings and recommendations have often had significant financial implications for the Organization in terms of achieving cost savings and effecting recovery of overpayments.

9. During the period covered by the review, 15 resident auditors were deployed to 10 missions, serving a total of 209 staff-months, as detailed in table 1.

10. During the same period, the resident auditors' work resulted in part in the issuance of more than 1,500 audit recommendations. Among other corrective action, they called for the recovery of fraud-related or other overpayments amounting to $9.5 million and the adoption of various cost-saving or income-enhancement schemes amounting to an additional $9.3 million. These recommendations, a breakdown of which is given in table 2, have enjoyed high rates — better than 80 per cent — of acceptance and implementation by mission management and, in certain cases, by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Management at Headquarters. The other recommendations called for the installation of stronger internal controls and other improvements meant to ensure high-quality operations as well as the proper, efficient and effective use of mission resources.

11. The number of recommendations issued by the resident auditors during the period from 1994 to 1999 represents about 38 per cent of the total recommendations (4,129) issued by OIOS in the same period in connection with its overall audit coverage of peacekeeping operations.

12. In addition to conducting audits by themselves, resident auditors periodically participate with visiting OIOS auditors from Headquarters in special audits of high-risk areas in each mission. These special audits are meant to complement the coverage provided regularly by the resident auditors and to ensure that, with the use of the visiting auditors, the high-risk areas are examined in a more extensive and in-depth manner. This practice of having resident auditors work closely from time to time with their colleagues from Headquarters — involving in part the extensive sharing of auditing knowledge, expertise and experience — has proved effective in various ways. It substantially reduces the risk of significant problem areas not being detected during an audit; it facilitates the process of developing audit findings and recommendations that fully meet OIOS reporting standards; and it serves as a supplementary training and professional development tool to enhance the resident auditors' knowledge of peacekeeping operations and other United Nations activities and systems, as well as of general auditing concepts, techniques and procedures.

13. The resident auditors' regular functions also include assisting visiting external auditors to familiarize themselves with the host mission and to identify audit-worthy areas for special focus. OIOS has

Table 1
Deployment of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions during the period from 1994 to 1999[a]

Mission	*Average annual expenditure budget (Millions of United States dollars)*	*Number and level of resident auditors*	*Number of staff-months served during the period 1994-1999*
UNOSOM	412.2	2 P-4/P-3	17
UNAVEM	146.7	1 P-4/P-3	13.5
MONUA	151.8	1 P-4/P-3	17
UNOMIL	14.9	1 P-4	7
UNPROFOR/UNPF	852.0	2 P-4	61
UNTAES	131.8	1 P-4	18.5
UNMIH/UNSMIH	54.8	1 P-4	28
MINURSO	36.9	1 P-3	6
UNMIBH	136.8	1 P-4	30
UNMIK	461.4	2 P-4/P-3	9

[a] Not included is UNTAET, which did not have a resident auditor until 2000.

Table 2
Recommendations issued by resident auditors during the period from 1994 to 1999

Mission	*Number of recommendations*	*Amount of overpayments recommended for recovery*	*Amount of recommended cost savings and additional income*
		(Thousands of United States dollars)	
MINURSO	50	NA	NA
MONUA	197	463	NA
UNAMET	23	NA	NA
UNAVEM III	323	2 081	3 463
UNMIBH	312	1 008	1 918
UNMIK	26	NA	263
UNOMIL	7	NA	NA
UNOSOM	95	4 314	1 360
UNPROFOR/ UNPF/UNTOFY	280	1 587	2 329
UNSMIH	164	37	16
UNTAES	94	1	NA
Total	**1 571**	**9 491**	**9 349**

received positive feedback from the Board of Auditors on this aspect of the resident auditors' work.

14. The resident auditors have also been called upon to assist the OIOS Investigations Section in investigating cases or allegations of fraud, presumptive fraud or other irregularities. This has been particularly useful in missions where no OIOS investigator is stationed. For example, in a recent well-publicized fraud case involving hundreds of thousands of dollars of mission funds, the resident auditor in UNMIBH — who was instrumental in uncovering the fraudulent activity — worked subsequently with OIOS investigators in the search for and compilation of evidence that led to the arrest and conviction of the mission staff member involved.

15. This does not, however, lessen the need that has developed to position resident OIOS investigators, especially in the larger peacekeeping missions — some of which, like UNMIK and UNTAET, have broader mandates. With the growth in peacekeeping missions, OIOS has experienced an associated increase in the number of cases requiring investigation. In 2000 more than 30 per cent of the new investigation cases related to peacekeeping operations. On a pilot basis, resident OIOS investigators have been assigned to UNMIK and UNTAET. The need for such resident investigators in other peacekeeping missions is also being explored.

16. Lastly, resident auditors have performed a varying number of ad hoc audits, as well as providing advice and assistance on a variety of subject matters or activities, in response to requests made by the heads of mission or chiefs of administration. Mission management typically consults or requests the assistance of resident auditors on such matters as the interpretation of rules, administrative instructions and other directives; the formulation of administrative or financial guidelines for local issuance; and the operations of local advisory bodies, including the contracts committees, the property survey and claims boards and ad hoc boards of inquiry or task forces. These internal consulting services provided by the resident auditors have proved useful in assisting mission management in its day-to-day decision-making tasks and in preventing or promptly addressing a variety of problems in the mission area.

IV. Determination of the number and salary level of resident auditors

17. Based on its experience with the resident auditor arrangement up to 1998, OIOS had concluded that, for the largest missions, more than one resident auditor was required to ensure the continued effectiveness of the arrangement. This led OIOS to develop and recommend the implementation of a formula to determine how many resident auditors should be deployed, and at what salary levels, in any peacekeeping mission. The formula was reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in connection with its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL (A/54/633).

18. In its report on UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL (A/54/647), the Advisory Committee endorsed the formula, which calls for the establishment or addition of a resident auditor post at the P-4 or P-3 level for each $100 million of annual budgeted expenditure, as well as the assignment of an auditing assistant at the G-6 or G-7 level for those missions with annual budgets exceeding $200 million. On this basis, the Advisory Committee recommended that two P-4 posts be authorized for resident auditors for UNAMSIL. In its subsequent report on the financing of UNTAET (A/55/531), the Advisory Committee, while noting the OIOS formula, recommended the authorization of four resident auditor posts (including one post at the P-5 level) in view of the nature of the mission, its structure and the level of troop strength. In view of the complexity of the operations in two similarly large missions — UNMIK and UNAMSIL — OIOS is proposing that the resident audit teams in these two missions also be headed by resident auditors at the P-5 level.

19. The General Assembly, in its resolution 54/241, requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly on the implications of implementing the formula recommended by OIOS. The formula basically affects missions with annual expenditure budgets of $100 million or more. Of the missions currently in operation, those with such budgets are MONUC, UNAMSIL, UNIFIL, UNMIBH, UNMIK, UNTAET and UNMEE. Of those seven missions, six have a total of 13 resident auditor posts (2 at the P-5 level and the rest at the P-4 or P-3 level) plus 3 posts at the G-6

level; one of those missions (UNIFIL) does not have a resident auditor post.

20. If the formula were fully implemented, it would result in the establishment in the missions' staffing tables of five additional resident auditor posts at the P-5, P-4 and P-3 levels and one auditing assistant post at the G-7 or G-6 level, as set out in table 3.

21. OIOS does not intend to apply the formula without first determining — primarily through a detailed risk assessment covering each mission and its audit requirements — the optimum number of resident auditors actually required, regardless of the magnitude of the mission's expenditure budget. It is the intention of OIOS to deploy any additional auditor called for under the formula only after making such a risk assessment and only on the basis of actual experience gained from the auditors initially deployed to each mission. The Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts recognizes the continuing benefits resulting from the use of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions and agrees that the number and level of resident auditors deployed would depend upon the size and complexity of the peacekeeping operation.

V. Challenges in the use of resident auditors

22. The success of the resident auditor arrangement has mainly depended — and will continue largely to depend — on the ability of the Organization to identify and recruit the right personnel. They preferably should have prior United Nations auditing experience — implying a good knowledge of United Nations systems, rules, policies and procedures — to enable them to be fully functional, without much prior training, immediately following their arrival in the mission area. They must be capable of conducting the more advanced types of audits — management, operational, value-for-money and information technology — in addition to the traditional financial/compliance type of auditing, to enable them to effectively satisfy the requirements of the host mission. They must also have good interpersonal and communication skills to enable them to maintain an effective working relationship with mission managers without compromising their status as independent auditors. They must have, above all, unquestionable integrity to enable them to gain and retain the required respect of their colleagues and to always be perceived as honest, credible and competent professionals.

23. OIOS has experienced continued difficulties in finding and recruiting suitable personnel to serve as resident auditors. The Office regularly receives applications from a great number of outside professional auditors who are interested in United Nations employment and who have solid auditing backgrounds. With very few exceptions, however, they do not have the requisite prior United Nations auditing experience. The exceptions have been former members of United Nations external audit groups, who, however, are available only for limited periods, as they prefer to remain in service with their respective governments' auditing departments and normally accept United Nations appointments on a secondment basis. In view of this situation, OIOS has established and continuously updates a roster of suitable candidates, based on applications directly received by the Organization and leads received from OIOS contacts in the international auditing community.

24. In addition to difficulties in identifying and recruiting suitable candidates for resident auditor posts, both OIOS and the resident auditors face additional challenges following the auditors' actual recruitment and deployment to the mission areas. Of those challenges, the most significant concern:

(a) The resident auditors' ability to achieve and maintain an effective working relationship with mission management without, at the same time, compromising or otherwise adversely affecting their status as independent providers of internal oversight services;

(b) The resident auditors' ability, and willingness over a relatively long-term period, to overcome the day-to-day problems and pressures posed by the difficult and frequently harsh working conditions in the mission areas.

25. Professional auditing standards require that auditors be independent of the activities they audit, because only if they are independent can they render the impartial and unbiased judgements essential to the proper conduct of audits. Such independence is made possible through adequate organizational and reporting arrangements, as well as the objectivity that the auditor must maintain in performing audits. While it is relatively easy to put into place and to adjust as circumstances require the necessary organizational and

Table 3
Implications of implementing a formula proposed by the Office of Internal Oversight Services to determine the number and salary level of resident auditors and auditing assistants in peacekeeping missions

Mission	*Annual expenditure budget (Millions of United States dollars)*	*Number and level of posts*	
		Currently authorized	*Called for under OIOS formula*
MONUC	141.3[a]	1 P-5, 1 P-3	1 P-4/P-3
UNAMSIL	476.7	2 P-4	1 P-5, 3 P-4/P-3, 1 G-7/G-6
UNIFIL	139.5	0	1 P-4/P-3
UNMIBH	153.6	1 P-4	1 P-4/P-3
UNMIK	461.4	1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 G-6	1 P-5, 3 P-4/P-3, 1 G-7/G-6
UNTAET	584.1	1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 G-6	1 P-5, 4 P-4/P-3, 1 G-7/G-6
UNMEE	200.0	1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 G-6	2 P-4/P-3, 1 G-7/G-6
Total	**2 156.6**	**13 P-5/P-4/P-3, 3 G-6**	**18 P-5/P-4/P-3, 4 G-7/G-6**

[a] This amount represents the balance of the $200 million commitment authority granted by the General Assembly for the 1999/00 period and is to cover estimated requirements for the period from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001.

reporting arrangements to help maintain the resident auditors' independence, it is not as easy for resident auditors, given the unique mission environment, to be — and to be seen as — truly objective, on a consistent and relatively long-term basis. To be truly independent and objective and to be seen as such, resident auditors must exercise great care and discipline in their official dealings and other contacts with management and mission staff in general, as well as in their day-to-day personal activities. In order to maintain the independence, objectivity and effectiveness of resident auditors, OIOS endeavours to rotate the resident auditors among different missions as well as Headquarters at regular intervals.

26. The implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) will present new challenges to OIOS in providing assurance of adequate internal controls in the growing number of large and more complex peacekeeping missions. The delegation of more authority from Headquarters to peacekeeping missions in procurement, recruitment and other administrative areas will require closer attention from OIOS resident auditors to management practices at the mission level. Furthermore, with the expansion of the resident auditors' operations at new peacekeeping missions, OIOS will need additional resources to provide stronger supervision, guidance and training at Headquarters. OIOS should organize training courses and workshops to enhance the professional skills of the resident auditors to enable them to discharge their responsibilities efficiently and effectively. This is especially important since OIOS plans to expand its audit coverage beyond the traditional (administrative) areas to substantive components of the peacekeeping operations, whose mandates have become increasingly complex and multifaceted. Also, the resident auditors' findings reported from different missions need to be more thoroughly analysed at Headquarters for systemic weaknesses, which should be brought to the attention of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for remedial action.

VI. Conclusion

27. It is the opinion of the Secretary-General, based on the experience gained by the Organization from the use of resident auditors in peacekeeping missions, that this practice should be continued and strengthened. The Secretary-General endorses the proposed formula for determining the number and salary levels of resident auditors that should be deployed to selected peacekeeping missions, on the understanding that the formula would be used as a guideline and the actual requirements in each case would be based on a detailed assessment of the related risks and other relevant factors.

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Letter dated 17 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters on the same subject, I have the honour to convey to you hereunder a list of the violations and infringements that were committed by Israel against Lebanon in the period from 1 to 15 January 2001. They include the detonation of landmines left behind by the Israeli occupation, which injured one citizen and caused serious damage. Lebanon regards these incidents as an extension of Israel's aggression against its people and territory.

1 January 2001

Between 1020 and 1125 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Mount Lebanon, the North and the South at very high altitudes.

Between 1220 and 1245 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Mount Lebanon, the North and the South at very high altitudes.

Between 1315 and 1320 hours Israeli forces at the Aramta hill outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at surrounding areas.

Between 1730 and 1740 Israeli forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands directed a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire at surrounding areas.

Between 2200 and 2210 hours two Israeli helicopters flew along the Lebanese border over the occupied territories opposite Ra's al-Naqurah before heading towards the sea.

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2 January 2001

Between 1050 and 1145 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Tibnin and Bint Jubayl areas at very high altitude.

At 1340 hours Israeli forces fired several bursts of light automatic-weapons fire towards the high ground along the blue line in an outlying areas of Ayta al-Sha`b. An Israeli helicopter also hovered over the same area on the side towards the occupied territories for five minutes.

At 2045 hours Israeli forces at the Ruwaysat al-Alam and Ramta hill outposts in the occupied Shab`a farmlands launched two illumination flares and directed several bursts of medium-weapons fire towards the surrounding area.

3 January 2001

At 0700 hours Israeli forces fired several 155-mm artillery shells and 120-mm mortar rounds towards the occupied Shab`a farmlands from their outposts at Ayn al-Tinah, Mazra`at Fashkul and Ruwaysat al-Alam. Some 100 goats belonging to Muhammad Abd Allah Zuhrah from Shab`a town were killed.

At 1100 hours an anti-personnel landmine exploded in Sujud while Najib Daqmaq, a native and resident of Nabatiyah born in 1962, was working on a tract of land with a bulldozer. No one was injured and there was no damage.

4 January 2001

In the morning Israeli forces were seen pouring concrete at their Mazra`at Fashkul outpost in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

Israeli forces again raised a balloon over their outpost opposite Markaba (outpost 320).

5 January 2001

Between 1140 and 1155 hours two explosions and several bursts of medium-weapons fire were heard inside the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

Between 1215 and 1245 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

7 January 2001

Between 1600 and 1630 hours Israeli forces blasted some rocks at their outpost at Mazra`at Fashkul in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

8 January 2001

Between 1000 and 1115 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South and the Shuf at moderate to very high altitudes.

At 2000 hours three artillery shells fired from Israeli enemy positions in the occupied territories impacted in an outlying area of Mazra`at al-Majidiyah in the liberated zone.

9 January 2001

At 1000 hours an Israeli helicopter landed at occupied Summaqah outpost in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba in Hasbayya district.

At 2210 hours an Israeli gunboat in Israeli territorial waters off Naqurah fired several bursts of medium-machine-gun fire towards the shore.

At 1030 hours movement of Israeli military vehicles was reported at the occupied Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba in Hasbayya district.

Between 1045 and 1050 hours Israeli forces strafed the areas around their outposts at Summaqah hill and Ramta hill in the occupied Shab`a farmlands with medium-weapons fire.

At 1110 and 1130 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the Summaqah, Ruwaysat al-Alam and Birkat al-Naqqar outposts in the occupied Shab`a farmlands. [They strafed surrounding areas] with medium-machine-gun fire, and five explosions were heard near the Birkat al-Naqqar outpost.

Between 1225 and 1320 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the Bekaa, the North and Mount Lebanon, breaking the sound barrier.

At 1210 hours two explosions were heard at the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba. This was followed by several bursts of machine-gun fire.

At 1740 hours unusual movements by Israeli military vehicles were noted at the occupied Summaqah and Ruwaysat al-Alam outposts in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba in Hasbayya district.

10 January 2001

At 1300 hours a landmine exploded as Ali Hamzah Sa`adah of Arabsalim was working on a bulldozer in Sujud. He was injured and taken to the hospital in Nabatiyah for medical attention.

At 2315 hours Israeli forces fired several 81-mm mortar rounds at areas around their outpost at Summaqah hill in the occupied Shab`a farmlands from one of their outposts in the same area.

11 January 2001

At 1745 hours Israeli forces blasted some rocks along the road leading to Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Shaykh) south of Majidiyah in the occupied territories in order to widen the carriageway.

12 January 2001

At 1720 hours Israeli forces at the Summaqah outpost launched two illumination flares over the surrounding area.

At 1745 and 1915 hours an Israeli gunboat offshore and outside Lebanese territorial waters launched three illumination flares over the sea off Ra's al-Naqurah.

United Nations A/55/737–S/2001/58

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 64
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 17 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 16 January 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ümit **Pamir**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 17 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith the letter dated 8 January 2001 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, concerning the recent abduction of a Turkish Cypriot by Greek Cypriot policemen at the mixed village of Pyla situated in the United Nations-controlled buffer zone (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 64, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aytuğ **Plümer**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

I understand that letters of protests about the arrest by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus police of one Panicos Tsakourmas, aged 39, while in possession of drugs is being circulated in all directions by the Greek Cypriot leadership. It is alleged that the said Tsakourmas was abducted by Turkish Cypriots in retaliation to "the arrest" by the Greek Cypriot police of Turkish Cypriot Ömer Gazi Tekoğul at Pyla, a mixed village.

Both Tsakourmas and the Turkish Cypriot Ömer Gazi Tekoğul, aged 42, are in custody pending their trial in the respective courts, one in the Greek side and the other before the Assize Court to be held in February in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Both sides allege that they were kidnapped by the police of the other side. Naturally, it is the relevant courts which will have to decide these issues. The allegation that Tsakourmas was arrested in retaliation to the unlawful arrest of Tekoğul is strenuously denied by the three policemen involved.

But the case of Tekoğul is a clear case of abduction by Greek Cypriot policemen who, concealing their identity, pretended to be a good friend of Tekoğul until the day he was abducted by them.

Tekoğul is a citizen of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, of impeccable character, in charge of the Turkish sports club in Pyla.

On 1 December 2000, at about 2040 hours he had started his car, parked outside a Turkish coffee shop in Pyla, in order to go home when the two Greek Cypriot "friends" approached his car and beckoned him to enter their car for a chat. As soon as Tekoğul entered their car, he was hit on the head, and driven away in the direction of Larnaca. Shortly, four other Greek Cypriot policemen joined them and Tekoğul was taken into custody while his car, outside the coffee shop in Pyla, continued to run. Some hours later, the family was informed by neighbours about the car and Tekoğul's father took it away.

In the mixed village of Pyla, under United Nations control, the rule is that if anyone is arrested by either side, the United Nations should immediately be informed. This was not done in the case of Tekoğul. The family was informed about the said "arrest" 12 hours after the abduction.

Tekoğul's Greek Cypriot advocate Andreas Constantinou made this statement to the Cyprus Mail, on 28 December 2000.

> "I believe the police lied in their statements and I told the Attorney-General this when they said Tekoğul was arrested in the free areas, if they arrested him in free areas why didn't police show us the car?"

All in all it is clear that Tekoğul was abducted in line with the well-known, and long practised Greek Cypriot policy of harassing Turkish Cypriots. Abduction of well-known or popular Turkish Cypriots had stopped for some time, but it appears that the practice is coming back unless United Nations authorities in Pyla take stern steps in this matter.

In view of growing publicity about the Tsakourmas' case I thought I should give this information to you for a fair appraisal of the situation.

Yours respectfully,

(*Signed*) Rauf R. **Denktaş**
President

United Nations A/55/738–S/2001/62

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Security Council

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Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 40
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 17 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters on the same subject, I have the honour to inform you hereunder of a series of violations of Lebanon's sovereignty that were committed by Israel on land, at sea and in the air between 13 and 31 December 2000.

13 December 2000

At 1440 hours bursts of machine-gun fire were heard coming from the occupied Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba (in the occupied Shab'a farmlands).

14 December 2000

Israeli forces removed the electrified barbed-wire perimeter defences around the Shu'ayb al-Kasir outpost in the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

At 0315 and 0345 hours an Israeli gunboat in Israeli territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah launched four illumination flares over a fishing boat in Lebanese territorial waters. The fishing boat advanced and came to a halt near the Israeli craft at the maritime boundary before heading out to sea.

On the night of 13/14 December Israeli forces dismantled the metal grid around their Rus outpost (in the occupied Shab'a farmlands).

16 December 2000

At 1325 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the Jba' area at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

At 1320 and 1500 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South, the western and central Bekaa, the North and Mount Lebanon, breaking the sound barrier.

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Between 1330 and 1900 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the western Bekaa and the South at very high altitudes.

At 1720 and 1740 hours Israeli forces fired several 81-mm mortar rounds at areas around their outpost at Jabal al-Rus in the Shab`a farmlands.

At 1930 and 2100 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the occupied Shab`a farmlands at very high altitude.

At 2035 and 2330 hours an Israeli gunboat off Ra's al-Naqurah launched five illumination flares over Israeli territorial waters and fired several bursts.

17 December 2000

At 1305 and 1325 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes while breaking the sound barrier, and an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the western Bekaa. Israeli warplanes also overflew the Jba` area at very high altitudes, breaking the sound barrier.

18 December 2000

At 1215 and 1230 hours Israeli warplanes overflew Tyre and Nabatiyah while breaking the sound barrier.

19 December 2000

At 1940 hours an Israeli gunboat off Ra's al-Naqurah launched three illumination flares over an area outside Lebanese territorial waters.

Israeli forces were building a road from Abbasiyah to Majidiyah along the Lebanese border.

20 December 2000

At 1030 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

21 December 2000

At 1245 hours Israeli forces fired two tank shells at the Mazra`at Bastara vicinity (in the Shab`a farmlands) from one of their outposts in the same area. They impacted near a flock of goats without causing damage.

At 1135 and 1155 hours Israeli forces opened fire from their outposts at Ruwaysat al-Alam and Summaqah in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

22 December 2000

Between 1745 and 1815 hours two Israeli helicopters flew along the Lebanese border over outlying areas of Markaba and Hula. A helicopter also flew over the vicinity of the Israeli forces' outpost at Summaqah (Shab`a farmlands) and over the Kafr Shuba vicinity towards the liberated territories.

Huge bulldozers working on trenches and large pits and Israeli trucks loaded with barrels were seen at Mazra`at Zibdin in the occupied Shab`a farmlands. It is believed that this is an attempt to bury toxic waste in these occupied farmlands.

At 0840 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South.

At 1745 and 1815 hours two Israeli helicopters flew along the Lebanese border over outlying areas of Markaba and Hula, over Summaqah and over outlying areas of Kafr Shuba towards the liberated territories.

At 0600 and 0651 hours an Israeli patrol in the occupied Shab`a farmlands directed several bursts of medium- and light-weapons fire at the area around the Ramta outpost.

At 1830 and 2015 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the Marj Uyun area at very high altitude.

Between 2200 and 2210 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around their outposts at Summaqah and Ruwaysat al-Alam (in the occupied Shab`a farmlands) with medium-weapons fire. An Israeli helicopter also overflew the same two outposts.

Between 1450 and 1500 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around their outpost at Summaqah hill.

Between 1500 and 1645 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the occupied Shab`a farmlands and the Marj Uyun area at very high altitude.

At 1630 hours Israeli enemy troops in the occupied Ruwaysat al-Summaqah locality in an outlying area of Kafr Shuba fired several bursts from sophisticated weapons.

At 1700 hours an anti-personnel landmine, one of the remnants of the Israeli occupation, exploded in the Manarah locality in an outlying area of Hula along the Lebanon-Palestine border. A passing donkey was killed but there were no human casualties.

23 December 2000

At 0630 and 0640 hours Israeli forces strafed the area around their outpost at Ramta hill (in the occupied Shab`a farmlands) with medium-weapons fire. An Israeli helicopter also flew over the outpost.

26 December 2000

In the morning Israeli forces at the Misgav Am outpost opposite Udaysah began to erect a very large umbrella-shaped radar installation. They also built a concrete foundation some 40 square metres in area at the Abbadah outpost.

Between 1155 and 1200 hours an Israeli helicopter flew over the Ruwaysat al-Alam outpost in the occupied Shab`a farmlands.

At 1300 hours Israeli forces at one of their outposts in the occupied Shab`a farmlands fired two 81-mm mortar rounds and directed a number of bursts of medium-machine-gun fire at the area around Mazra`at Bastara and in the vicinity of a flock belonging to Qasim Ali Zuhrah (born in Shab`a in 1960, mother's name A'ishah and a resident of Mazra`at Bastara).

At 2130 hours Israeli forces launched four illumination flares over the sea off Ra's al-Naqurah along the Lebanon-Israel boundary from one of their positions in the occupied territories opposite the town of Marjin.

27 December 2000

At 1000 and 1115 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at various altitudes.

Between 1220 and 1310 hours Israeli warplanes overflew the South and Hasbayya, launching heat balloons.

Between 1230 and 1430 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the occupied Shab'a farmlands at very high altitude.

At 1400 hours an Israeli gunboat outside Lebanese territorial waters off Ra's al-Naqurah fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire in all directions.

At 2145 hours Israeli forces launched three illumination flares over the southern Lebanese border opposite Dahirah from their positions in the occupied territories.

28 December 2000

Between 1100 and 1400 hours Israeli warplanes overflew all parts of Lebanon at very high altitudes breaking the sound barrier.

Between 1245 and 1250 hours three Israeli helicopters overflew the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

Between 1305 and 1445 hours an Israeli soldier opened fire on some citizens at the tomb of Shaykh Abbad. An 8-year-old child, Mustafa Ali Yasin, received a bullet in the right arm. Qasim Muhammad Arandas was wounded in the foot; Nawfal Ghazi Ali received a bullet in the left leg; and Muhammad Ala' al-Din was wounded in the right arm.

At intervals between 1530 and 1700 hours Israeli forces strafed the areas around their outposts at Ruwaysat al-Alam and Summaqah in the occupied Shab'a farmlands with medium-weapons fire. An Israeli reconnaissance aircraft also overflew the same area.

Between 1810 and 1825 hours three Israeli helicopters and a reconnaissance aircraft overflew the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

29 December 2000

At 1245 hours one of the personnel in an Israeli patrol fired a round into the air at the Fatimah Gate.

Between 1845 and 1850 hours Israeli forces launched four illumination flares over the area between their outpost at Ruwaysat al-Alam and that at Ramta in the farmlands opposite Kafr Shuba.

Between 1945 and 2025 hours two Israeli helicopters flew over the Ruwaysat al-Alam and Ramta outposts at very high altitudes.

30 December 2000

At 1430 hours Israeli troops at the Fatimah Gate fired at Hilal Ahmad al-Hajj, 22, hitting him in the head and killing him.

31 December 2000

Between 1130 and 1135 hours Israeli forces strafed the areas around their outposts at Summaqah hill and Ruwaysat al-Alam hill in the occupied Shab'a farmlands with medium-machine-gun fire.

Between 1150 and 1205 hours Israeli forces fired five direct-fire rounds and a number of bursts of medium-weapons fire from their outpost at Ramta in the Shab'a farmlands. Two Israeli helicopters also flew over the outpost.

Between 1900 and 1945 hours an Israeli reconnaissance aircraft overflew the occupied Shab'a farmlands.

This latest series of violations, which caused the death of one citizen at the Fatimah Gate and involved the detonation of landmines left behind by the Israeli occupation that caused serious damage, is in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of Lebanon's sovereignty. It poses a threat to stability in the region, and Lebanon regards it as an extension of Israel's aggression against its people and territory.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sélim **Tadmoury**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/739

General Assembly

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Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 143
Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Financial performance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the financial performance report of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/231 of 8 June 1999, appropriated an amount of $45,630,927 gross ($43,892,427 net) for the maintenance of UNFICYP, including an amount of $2,270,759 for the support account for peacekeeping operations and an amount of $445,268 for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, and amounts to be met through voluntary contributions from the Governments of Cyprus ($14,630,810) and Greece ($6,500,000).

Expenditure for the period totalled $45,107,500 gross ($43,388,400 net), resulting in an unencumbered balance of $523,400 gross ($504,000 net). The unencumbered balance resulted from lower ration costs for troops, lower travel costs under civilian police personnel as well as lower salary costs for international and local staff, offset by higher expenditures under non-staff operational requirements.

The action to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the Force is set out in paragraph 16 of the present report.

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Contents

		Paragraphs	*Page*
I.	Introduction	1–5	3
II.	Implementation of the budget	6–12	3
III.	Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000	13–15	4
IV.	Action to be taken by the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session	16	5
Annexes			
I.	Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000: summary statement		6
II.	Supplementary explanation on significant variances		8
III.	Planned and actual deployment of military and civilian personnel for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000		15
IV.	Apportionment and expenditure for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000		17

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). From its inception until 15 June 1993, costs of the Force were financed by troop-contributing countries, by the Government of Cyprus and by voluntary contributions to UNFICYP (article 19 of the Agreement concerning the Status of the Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus).

2. In its resolution 47/236 of 14 September 1993, the General Assembly decided that commencing 16 June 1993, the costs of the Force that were not covered by voluntary contributions should be treated as expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.

3. The Security Council extended the mandate of the Force in subsequent resolutions, the most recent of which was resolution 1331 (2000) of 13 December 2000 by which the Council extended the mandate of the Force to 15 June 2001.

4. The budget for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 was set out in the report of the Secretary-General dated 26 January 1999 (A/53/805) and amounted to $43,631,800 gross ($41,722,300 net). The cost estimates provided for maintenance of the Force at a strength of 1,230 contingent personnel and 35 civilian police monitors, supported by 259 (44 international and 215 local staff) civilian staff.

5. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/231 of 8 June 1999, appropriated the amount of $45,630,927 gross ($43,892,427 net) for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000, inclusive of an amount of $2,270,759 for the support account for peacekeeping operations, and the amount of $445,268 for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. The appropriated amount also reflected the fact that the Government of Cyprus provides one third of the cost of the Force ($14,630,810), and the Government of Greece provides $6,500,000 through voluntary contributions. An amount of $24,500,117 gross ($22,761,617 net) was assessed on Member States for the period.

II. Implementation of the budget

6. Information on the operations of UNFICYP during the reporting period is contained in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 29 November 1999 (S/1999/1203 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and 26 May 2000 (S/2000/496 and Corr.1).

7. As part of its continuing effort to improve the management of its resources, the mission undertook a number of new initiatives as well as expanded ongoing cost-saving measures to ensure that the mission is managed with a maximum of economy and efficiency.

8. The mission's outsourcing programme, which had started in April 1999 with the outsourcing of janitorial services in the United Nations Protected Area, was extended to all the Sectors during the period. Feasibility studies and cost benefit analysis of the Force's catering services subsequently led to the outsourcing of the catering services in the United Nations Protected Area and Sector 2. In addition to the reduction of 11 staff posts due to the outsourcing of janitorial services in the

United Nations Protected Area, there was a further reduction of 57 local staff posts during the period under review decreasing the local staff level to 147 members, a 28 per cent reduction for the period, and which will result in long-term savings to the Organization.

9. As a result of a comprehensive review of the commercially hired vehicle fleet, which had been carried out in 1999, the specifications for a number of vehicles were reduced while still ensuring that operational requirements were met. This initiative, combined with a successful bidding exercise in 1999, resulted in significant savings to the Organization.

10. Savings also resulted from the continued rationalization and consolidation of office space, accommodation and ancillary facilities within the Blue Beret Camp in the United Nations Protected Area.

11. For example, relocation of the UNFICYP Supply Warehouse next to the centrally located rations warehouse at the mission headquarters during the period resulted in reduced operating costs and efficiency gains realized since the number of support staff required to serve both warehouses could subsequently be streamlined. Reviews of other possible initiatives in a similar vein are also being examined.

12. The mission also implemented a procurement plan, which specified requirements and procurement action deadlines to ensure that goods and services were procured in the most efficient and least costly manner. The mission continued to enlarge its vendor roster and to re-bid service contracts, which resulted in some cost reductions and improvements in the quality of services rendered.

III. Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000

13. Table 1 below indicates the appropriation of $45,630,927 gross ($43,892,427 net) for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. Expenditure amounted to $45,107,500 gross ($43,388,400 net) inclusive of $10,664,300 in unliquidated obligations. The resulting unencumbered balance of $523,400 gross ($504,000 net) represents in gross terms, approximately 1.1 per cent of the amount appropriated.

14. Annex I to the present report contains the financial performance information for the reporting period by budget line. Column 1 of the annex reflects the apportionment of the resources provided to UNFICYP during the period under review pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/231. The expenditures recorded for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 are shown in column 3 by budget line item. Variances between the apportionment of resources by budget line item and the actual expenditures are shown in column 4.

15. Supplementary information on significant variances in the financial performance report is presented in annex II to the present report. The planned and actual deployment of military and civilian personnel for the reporting period is contained in annex III. Annex IV contains a chart showing the apportionment and expenditure for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000.

Table 1
Apportionment and expenditure
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	*Apportionment*	*Expenditure*[a]	*Variance*
Military personnel	22 978.1	22 453.7	524.4
Civilian personnel	10 106.5	9 814.1	292.4
Operational requirements	8 072.0	8 360.6	(288.6)
Other programmes	19.8	43.9	(24.1)
United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi	445.3	445.3	-
Support account for peacekeeping operations	2 270.8	2 270.8	-
Staff assessment	1 738.5	1 719.1	19.4
Gross requirements	**45 630.9**	**45 107.5**	**523.4**
Income from staff assessment	(1 738.5)	(1 719.1)	(19.4)
Net requirements	**43 892.4**	**43 388.4**	**504.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	-	-	-
Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	-	-	-
Total resources	**45 630.9**	**45 107.5**	**523.4**

[a] Includes an amount of $10,664,300 in unliquidated obligations.

Table 2
Authorized staffing, incumbency and vacancy rates for military and civilian personnel for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000

Personnel category	*Authorized strength*	*Actual strength (average)*	*Vacancy rate (percentage)*
Military contingents	1 230	1 219	1
Civilian police	35	34	3
International staff	44	40	10
Local staff	215	190	12

IV. Action to be taken by the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session

16. **The action to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNFICYP is a decision on the treatment of the unencumbered balance of $523,400 gross ($504,000 net) for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000.**

Annex I

Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000: summary statement

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure		*(1)* *Apportionment* [a]	*(2)* *Non-recurrent expenditures*	*(3)* *Total expenditures (inclusive of non-recurrent expenditures)*	*(4) = (1 - 3)* *Variance*
I.	**Military personnel**				
	1. Military observers	-	-	-	-
	2. Military contingents	21 489.3	-	20 964.9	524.4
	3. Other requirements pertaining to military personnel				
	(a) Contingent-owned equipment	1 288.8	-	1 288.8	-
	(b) Self-sustainment	-	-	-	-
	(c) Death and disability compensation	200.0	-	200.0	-
	Subtotal, line 3	1 488.8	-	1 488.8	-
	Total, category I	**22 978.1**	**-**	**22 453.7**	**524.4**
II.	**Civilian personnel**				
	1. Civilian police	351.2	-	218.5	132.7
	2. International and local staff	9 755.3	-	9 595.7	159.6
	3. United Nations Volunteers	-	-	-	-
	4. Government-provided personnel	-	-	-	-
	5. Civilian electoral observers	-	-	-	-
	Total, category II	**10 106.5**	**-**	**9 814.1**	**292.4**
III.	**Operational requirements**				
	1. Premises/accommodation	1 328.7	389.3	1 666.0	(337.3)
	2. Infrastructure repairs	190.0	-	155.2	34.8
	3. Transport operations	2 348.7	534.7	1 843.2	505.5
	4. Air operations	1 213.8	-	1 269.6	(55.8)
	5. Naval operations	-	-	-	-
	6. Communications	851.6	418.0	911.2	(59.6)
	7. Other equipment	535.1	813.4	882.4	(347.3)
	8. Supplies and services	1 537.1	-	1 606.3	(69.2)
	9. Air and surface freight				
	(a) Transport of contingent-owned equipment	-	-	-	-
	(b) Commercial freight and cartage	67.0	-	26.7	40.3
	Subtotal, line 9	67.0	-	26.7	40.3
	Total, category III	**8 072.0**	**2 155.4**	**8 360.6**	**(288.6)**

Category of expenditure	*(1)* *Apportionment* [a]	*(2)* *Non-recurrent expenditures*	*(3)* *Total expenditures (inclusive of non-recurrent expenditures)*	*(4) = (1 - 3)* *Variance*
IV. Other programmes				
1. Election-related supplies and services	-	-	-	-
2. Public information programmes	4.8	1.0	1.0	3.8
3. Training programmes	15.0	42.9	42.9	(27.9)
4. Mine-clearing programmes	-	-	-	-
5. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-	-	-	-
Total, category IV	**19.8**	**43.9**	**43.9**	**(24.1)**
V. United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi	**445.3**	**-**	**445.3**	**(0.0)**
VI. Support account for peacekeeping operations	**2 270.8**	**-**	**2 270.8**	**(0.0)**
VII. Staff assessment	**1 738.5**	**-**	**1 719.1**	**19.4**
Gross requirements, categories I-VII	45 630.9	2 199.4	45 107.5	523.4
VIII. Income from staff assessment	**(1 738.5)**	**-**	**(1 719.1)**	**(19.4)**
Net requirements, categories I-VIII	43 892.4	2 199.4	43 388.4	504.0
IX. Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
X. Voluntary contributions in kind (non-budgeted)	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
Total	**45 630.9**	**2 199.4**	**45 107.5**	**523.4**

[a] Based on appropriation provided by General Assembly resolution 53/231 of 8 June 1999.

Annex II

Supplementary explanation on significant variances

Military personnel

Apportionment: $22,978,100; expenditure: $22,453,700; variance: $524,400

1. The unutilized balance of $524,400 was largely due to enhanced management and control of the distribution of rations; application of a 5 per cent non-utilization factor, and lower contract prices for fresh rations (fresh fruits, vegetables, dairy products and bread) than budgeted, which resulted in savings of $532,600. These and other savings under welfare and under daily allowance were offset by higher actual requirements under emplacement, rotation and repatriation of troops ($20,900) due largely to higher charter flights costs as a result of increased fuel costs.

Civilian personnel

Apportionment: $10,106,500; expenditure: $9,814,100; variance: $292,400

2. Savings of $292,400 under this heading were mainly under travel of civilian police ($131,700), international staff salaries ($214,700), local staff salaries ($192,200) and overtime ($10,000), which were offset by higher requirements under general temporary assistance ($64,800), common staff costs ($167,700) and other travel ($24,700).

3. Savings of $131,700 under travel of civilian police were realized partly as a result of fewer civilian police monitors being rotated and owing to lower airfares than budgeted. Moreover, one Government providing civilian police did not seek reimbursement for its repatriation/rotation costs.

4. Partly due to temporary reassignment of international staff to assist in newly established peacekeeping operations, the mission experienced an average vacancy rate of 10 per cent for international staff during the period compared to the budgeted rate of 5 per cent, which resulted in an unutilized balance of $214,700 under international staff salaries.

5. The outsourcing of general and support services — which started in April 1999, with contracting out janitorial services in the United Nations Protected Area, which resulted in the abolition of 11 local staff posts effective 30 June 1999 — continued during the period. In October 1999, a catering service contract was put in place in the United Nations Protected Area that allowed the abolition of 18 staff posts as of 31 December 1999. Further outsourcing activities carried out during the period included contracting out catering services at Sector 2 and janitorial services in all Sectors in April 2000, which led to the abolition of 39 posts effective 30 June 2000.

6. Thus, as a result of the mission's outsourcing activities effected during the reporting period, 57 local staff posts became redundant. This contributed to the average vacancy rate of 12 per cent that led to an unutilized balance of $192,200 under local staff salaries. As a consequence, during the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000

financial periods, local staffing requirements were reduced by 74 posts to 147, representing a 28 per cent reduction and long-term savings to the Organization.

7. While provision had been made for overtime for local staff such as drivers and catering staff that were required to work beyond normal office hours, the outsourcing of catering services at mission headquarters in October 1999 and in Sector 2 in April 2000 resulted in savings of $10,000 for overtime.

8. Additional requirements of $64,800 under general temporary assistance and $24,700 under other travel costs were largely attributable to backstopping requirements in connection with the proximity talks, which took place during the reporting period.

9. Additional requirements of $167,700 under common staff costs were mainly due to higher actual international common staff costs than budgeted.

Operational requirements

Apportionment: $8,072,000; expenditure: $8,360,600; variance: ($288,600)

10. The over-expenditure of $288,600 was due to additional requirements under premises/accommodation ($337,300), air operations ($55,800), communications ($59,600), other equipment ($347,300), and supplies and services ($69,200), partially offset by savings under infrastructure repairs ($34,800), transport operations ($505,500) and air and surface freight ($40,300).

Premises/accommodation

Apportionment: $1,328,700; expenditure: $1,666,000; variance: ($337,300)

11. Part of the additional requirements of $337,300 under this heading was necessitated by higher than budgeted costs of improving military accommodation and working facilities in the United Nations buffer zone. This included electrical systems, water reticulation system repairs, new roofing and other work ($185,300).

12. Higher than budgeted costs of $30,200 under maintenance supplies resulted from the mission's programme to refurbish United Nations camps, Patrol Bases and manned Observation Posts. This programme utilized United Nations engineering and support personnel, including qualified engineering personnel with the contingents, and included electrical, plumbing and roofing materials.

13. Consolidation of some of the mission's operations within the Blue Beret Camp and activities and facilities in the United Nations Protected Area resulted in some offsetting savings of $89,000 under maintenance services.

14. Requirements under utilities increased by $112,000 owing mainly to the increase in the cost of electricity as a result of the global rise in fuel prices and the decision of the Government of Cyprus early in 1999 to cease subsidizing electricity costs in Cyprus.

15. An amount of $98,800 was required under construction/prefabricated buildings. During the reporting period, the need arose to replace deteriorated accommodation facilities at Camp Brown that were found to be unsafe.

Infrastructure repairs

Apportionment: $190,000; expenditure: $155,200; variance: $34,800

16. Savings of $34,800 were realized owing in part to favourable prices obtained through competitive bidding for the materials required to repair the patrol track, and in part to the use of transferred engineering equipment from the United Nations Logistics Base to the mission and the acquisition of new equipment, which reduced the need to hire such equipment.

Transport operations

Apportionment: $2,348,700; expenditure: $1,843,200; variance: $505,500

17. An additional amount of $116,100 was required under purchase of vehicles. Provision was made for the purchase of five replacement trucks, two of which exceeded the budgeted amount, resulting in an additional requirement of $76,300. There were additional requirements for a mini-backhoe front loader for use in maintaining the patrol track ($31,800) and for the transfer of engineering equipment from the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi ($8,000).

18. Savings of $716,400 under rental of vehicles were the result of a successful bidding exercise and the downscaling of a number of vehicles in terms of size and type while still satisfying operational requirements. Additionally, the mission opted for third-party insurance only for these vehicles. Vehicle repair costs incurred were charged to the spare parts, repairs and maintenance budget line.

19. The additional requirement of $14,500 under workshop and test equipment was primarily attributable to the need to procure a wheel-changing device for tactical armed vehicles in the mission area ($13,500) and for tools urgently needed for the Support Services Workshop ($1,000).

20. The additional expenditure amount of $173,500 shown under this heading was due to increased repair costs as a result of self-insurance for all commercially hired vehicles and the fact that vehicular accident repair costs were correctly charged under spare parts, repairs and maintenance instead of under claims and adjustments, where budgeted (see para. 40 below).

21. Favourable prices obtained through competitive bidding for supply of petrol and diesel from the south, and efforts by the UNFICYP Administration to increase recoveries for liberty travel, resulted in savings of $87,000 under petrol, oil and lubricants.

Air operations

Apportionment: $1,213,800; expenditure: $1,269,600; variance: ($55,800)

22. The higher-than-budgeted expenditure under this heading was due to the fact that a portion of the hire charges for June 1999 ($80,000) was charged to the period under review, partially offset by savings under aviation fuel as a result of the lower number of flying hours flown by both UNFICYP helicopters during the period and to the lower cost of fuel than budgeted and under liability and war-risk insurance costs.

Communications

Apportionment: $851,600; expenditure: $911,200; variance: ($59,600)

23. There was an additional requirement of $126,500 under the communications equipment, spare parts and supplies and workshop and test equipment budget line. The additional requirement of $55,400 under the heading of communications equipment was due to the purchase of two Ericsson MD110 exchange systems for Sector 2 and Sector 4 headquarters to replace obsolete equipment ($39,200), the necessity to replace 16 non-Y2K-compliant facsimile machines ($14,800) and to replace 10 pagers and other equipment ($1,400). Further expenditure was incurred under spare parts and supplies for additional spare parts for the satellite communications systems and to upgrade telephones in order to expand the capacity of the new Ericsson telephone system at mission headquarters ($62,700). Furthermore, the mission needed to obtain a digital cable analyser and a fibre-test adapter option set, which had not been envisaged at the time of the budget preparations, resulting in additional requirement of $8,400 under workshop and test equipment.

24. The above additional requirements were partially offset by savings under commercial communications ($66,900). In this connection, while the mission's share of intelsat/transponder lease charges were higher than budgeted, the extensive and unlimited access to the United Nations satellite network for telephone calls via the new Ericsson exchange system and improved administrative procedures for collecting telephone user charges for private calls as well as official contingent calls, resulted in the net unutilized balance reported.

Other equipment

Apportionment: $535,100; expenditure: $882,400; variance: ($347,300)

25. Reasons for the significant variances under this heading are highlighted below.

26. Savings of $32,000 under office furniture were in part due to the acquisition of furniture at lower cost than budgeted. Also, ongoing rationalization of the mission's office space, reorganizing and relocating the supply warehouse from the British-retained site to mission headquarters and the reduction of UNFICYP's geographic "footprint" at its headquarters in the United Nations Protected Area allowed for redistribution of existing furniture.

27. The additional requirement of $20,400 under office equipment is attributable to the need to procure a digital image laser colour photocopier to reproduce operational maps of the buffer zone for distribution to operations personnel.

28. During the period, it was necessary to replace 40 additional non-Y2K-compliant desktop computers, 2 additional laptops and 113 desk jet printers ($73,200) and purchase a computer-based engineering design and planning programme ($21,500). As a result of the extension of the LAN to the Sectors and the United Nations Flight Operations Unit, to improve communications between the Sectors and headquarters through e-mail and access to Lotus Notes, additional equipment and accessories amounting to $16,200 was required. In addition, an amount of $22,400 was obligated for the purchase of video-conferencing equipment for the mission.

29. As the two generators budgeted for purchase during the period were in fact obtained through transfer from the United Nations Logistics Base, these funds were utilized instead for the procurement of two generator housings to accommodate these generators.

30. Unbudgeted requirements were incurred under observation equipment ($12,800). During the period, it had been planned to replace 70 binoculars, which were beyond economical repair and scheduled for write-off, from United Nations Logistics Base stock. However, as Brindisi stocks were fully depleted, there was a requirement to purchase this equipment ($9,800). Additional costs were also incurred in connection with the shipping of surplus night observation devices with a view to testing them for suitability for use for UNFICYP's operations.

31. An unplanned expense of $36,600 was incurred for the procurement of two 14,000-litre portable aviation fuel storage tanks in order to release the fuel storage point located on the British-retained site in the United Nations Protected Area and which had become uneconomical to maintain.

32. An additional amount of $194,400 was required under miscellaneous equipment for the purchase of two hydraulic lifts for the supply and rations warehouse ($24,600), for 115 additional electronic vehicle monitoring devices (car log systems) ($80,900) and for acquisition of 61 new and replacement air conditioners as part of the continuing improvements to the United Nations Protected Area and Sector premises ($48,000). In addition, 50 garbage bins were procured to meet local authority requirements ($14,300). Additional funds were required for the replacement of 3 radar guns and 2 Alco meters, the costs of which were underestimated in the budget ($6,900), 100 replacement windsocks ($6,500), 64 electrical heating panels to replace gas heaters that are potential health hazards ($8,700), 3 additional digital cameras ($2,500), and replacement of 2 vehicle steam cleaners ($2,000).

33. As a result of older equipment being written off, the requirements for spare parts, repairs and maintenance were less than budgeted, resulting in an unutilized balance of $68,000 under this heading.

34. An additional expenditure of $42,600 was required for the procurement and installation of water and purification equipment at the observation posts in the buffer zone in order to provide a safe source of potable water to military and civilian police personnel, thus obviating the need to provide bottled water at these locations.

Supplies and services

Apportionment: $1,537,100; expenditure: $1,606,300; variance: ($69,200)

35. The net over-expenditure under this heading of $69,200 was due to a number of factors. An additional amount of $450,300 was required as a result of outsourcing of janitorial services in the United Nations Protected Area from July 1999 to April 2000 ($95,600), janitorial services for the United Nations Protected Area and Sectors from April to June 2000 ($54,600), catering services for the United Nations Protected Area from October 1999 to June 2000 ($237,200) and catering services for Sector 2 from April to June 2000 ($62,900). At the time of the preparation of the budget, it was not foreseen that these services would be outsourced and as a result no provision was included in the budget for the period. A further amount of $22,000

was required for other contractual services, such as increased requirements for barbering services and for miscellaneous contractual services.

36. The increase in the contractual services requirements were largely offset by significant savings due to reduced costs under other contractual services following re-bidding of laundry and dry cleaning services ($295,400), deep cleaning services for the catering areas, which are included in the catering contracts ($75,500), and other contractual services ($32,200).

37. Centralized renewal of software licences for Reality, Sun Accounts, Progen and Lotus Notes at Headquarters, resulted in savings of $6,400 under data processing services.

38. Although a number of high-level meetings were held during the period, it was decided that specialized security services were not required, resulting in an unutilized balance of $28,000.

39. Savings of $33,700 under medical treatment and services was due to improvements in the hygiene standards in the Sectors as a result of regular inspections by the mission's Force Hygiene Officer of kitchen/dining facilities and other areas throughout the mission to ensure that appropriate hygiene levels are adhered to at all times. Additionally, referrals to local doctors and clinics were reduced as more personnel were treated at the recently established UNFICYP Medical Centre.

40. While provision had been made for third-party claims resulting from loss or damage to property, legal and assessors' fees and for vehicular accident repairs for the period, no payments were made for claims during the period and vehicle accident repairs were charged to the spare parts, repairs and maintenance line item, resulting in an unutilized balance of $51,600.

41. Additional requirements of $151,900 under miscellaneous other services were primarily due to bank charges ($138,400), higher costs for advertisements in local newspapers than budgeted ($33,600) and for electrical consultancy fees ($9,700), which were offset by savings of $29,800 as a result of sponsorship by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) of the United Nations Day event in October 1999.

42. Strict control of the use of stationery and office supplies contributed to the unutilized balance of $13,200 under this line item.

43. Owing to reduced requirements for medical supplies during the period and the utilization of remaining stock from the prior period, savings of $7,200 were realized.

44. Savings of $27,600 under sanitation and cleaning materials resulted from the implementation of janitorial and catering services contracts in the United Nations Protected Area and the Sectors, which provided for contractor-supplied equipment, supplies and other consumables.

45. Owing to lower than anticipated production costs for the Blue Beret publication and a reduction in the number of newspapers and magazines purchased as a result of a review by the UNFICYP management, savings of $6,600 were realized under Subscriptions.

46. Savings of $24,100 under uniform items, flags and decals were due to improvements in stock management, resulting in more efficient utilization of existing stock of items held by the mission.

47. Savings of $7,600 were recorded under Field Defence Stores as the planned procurement of crowd control barriers did not proceed.

48. In preparation for outsourcing catering services, there was an additional requirement of $55,700 under quartermaster and general stores to replace kitchen utensils at Sector locations.

Air and surface freight

Apportionment: $67,000; expenditure: $26,700; variance: $40,300

49. The unutilized balance of $40,300 under this heading was due to the fact that such costs were recorded as part of the equipment purchase costs.

Public information programmes

Apportionment: $4,800; expenditure: $1,000; variance: $3,800

50. Savings of $3,800 were realized due to lower requirements than budgeted during the reporting period.

Training programmes

Apportionment: $15,000; expenditure: $42,900; variance: ($27,900)

51. Provision had been made to cover the costs of specialized training in new software and hardware technologies and for maintenance and repairs of communications equipment for staff in the Electronic Services Section. However, travel and daily subsistence allowance for training budgeted under "Other travel of staff" were charged to this budget line. Moreover, additional requirements arose in connection with training of UNFICYP mechanics in Paris and Nairobi and the Chief Finance Officers workshop in Brindisi. The above resulted in an over-expenditure of $27,900 under this heading.

Staff assessment

Apportionment: $1,738,500; expenditure: $1,719,100; variance: $19,400

52. The unutilized balance was mainly due to the average vacancy rate of 10 per cent in respect of international staff and 12 per cent for local staff.

Income from staff assessment

Apportionment: ($1,738,500); expenditure: ($1,719,100); variance: ($19,400)

53. This amount is derived from staff assessment (see para. 52 above).

Annex III

Planned and actual deployment of military and civilian personnel for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000

1. Military contingents



2. Civilian police



3. International staff



4. Local staff



Annex IV

Apportionment and expenditure for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000



United Nations A/55/740–S/2001/70

General Assembly
Security Council

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23 January 2001

Original: English

General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda items 20 and 46
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 23 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of a letter dated 23 January 2001 from A. Abdullah, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Ravan **Farhâdi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-22313 (E) 240101

Annex to the identical letters dated 23 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Following the convening of the meeting in Akora Khattak, Pakistan, on 10 January 2001 of the Pakistan-based extremist groups, advocating maximized military support of Pakistan to the Taliban-Osama coalition, and defying the United Nations sanctions against the militia, the Pakistan military junta has brought in new military force in northern Afghanistan.

Reports gathered recently by the security services of the Islamic State of Afghanistan indicate that since 12 January 2001, a number of new commando and artillery units of the Pakistan Army have been deployed in northern Afghanistan, in preparation for foreseeable attacks on the government forces.

According to the reports, in a sweeping move, preceding the deadline of the imposition of the new United Nations sanctions against the Taliban mercenaries, Pakistan army officers and units have recently been posted to Afghanistan as follows:

1. General Qamar-u-Zaman of the Pakistan Army has been assigned as the new officer in charge of military operations in Afghanistan, replacing Pakistan's General of the Army Saeed Zafar, who functioned in the same capacity in Afghanistan over the past year;
2. General Tariq Bashir, formerly commander of the Ninth Commando Division of the Pakistan Army;
3. Brigadier Momin of the Kohat Division of the Pakistan Army;
4. Colonel Sanaullah of the Kohat Division of the Pakistan Army;
5. Colonel Hamza of Pakistan's military intelligence services (ISI);
6. The 998 Brigade has been replaced by the 996 Brigade of Charat Commando Divisions, under Brigadier Amjad of Sayawali, Pakistan;
7. The 117 Brigade has been replaced by the 994 Brigade, under Faizan Khan of Laki Maroot, Pakistan;
8. The 625 Artillery Battalion has been newly deployed in the northern Kunduz province, under ranking officer Rafique of the Pakistan Army;
9. Brigadier Amjad has been assigned as the commanding officer of Pakistan attacking forces in the northern Takhar province. The Pakistan Army units operating under Brigadier Amjad are reported to have been especially equipped with infrastructure capability to cross the Kokcha River, where the government forces are entrenched;
10. The 998 Brigade has been withdrawn from the fronts, and designated as the Reserve Corps, to take over the ongoing routine military training in preparation for future deployments across Afghanistan;
11. The total additional number of armed Pakistan nationals, recently dispatched to northern Afghanistan, is estimated at about 1,500.

According to the reports, Pakistan forces have joined scores of heavily armed militants from the Osama bin Laden Al-Qaeda terrorist network and a sizeable number of Taliban mercenaries, already poised to attack territories across the Kokcha River on the border of Badakhshan province in the north-east. An attack by the Pakistan-Taliban-Osama forces on 12 January, targeting Khoja-Ghar, Dasht-e-Qala and Ay Khanum along the same area was beaten back fiercely by the government troops, with as many as 200 Taliban dead and heavy material losses.

The convening of the Akora Khattak meeting in broad daylight by as many as 30 militant groups, protected by hundreds of heavily armed guards of their own, while martial law imposed by the military Government of Pakistan remains in effect throughout the country, among other things, serves as ample proof that the gathering was orchestrated by the Government of Pakistan aimed at intensifying and prolonging the war in Afghanistan and yet misleading the international community. The gathering, attended by top-ranking officers of the Pakistan ISI, such as General (retired) Hamid Gul, former Chief of military intelligence services and General Aslam Beg of the Pakistan Army, starkly unravels Pakistan's un-Islamic exploitation of religion for its unholy military and political hegemonic purposes, while bringing to light the treacherous and bogus preaching of the Pakistan political and military establishment concerning the "negative impacts of the United Nations sanctions on the civilian population of Afghanistan".

The current surge in Pakistan military involvement in Afghanistan clearly manifests Pakistan's belligerence against the Security Council resolution, that, inter alia, calls for an embargo on provision of arms and military aid to the Taliban, immediate withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Afghanistan and closure of all terrorist training camps inside Afghanistan.

(*Signed*) Dr. A. **Abdullah**
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Islamic State of Afghanistan

United Nations A/55/741

General Assembly

Distr.: General
23 January 2001

Original: English

Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 50
Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa

Letter dated 22 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

I have the honour to attach hereto the text of Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke's address to the African Group, given on 17 January 2001 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) James B. **Cunningham**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

01-22457 (E) 290101

Annex to the letter dated 22 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Address to the African Group by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld Auditorium, 17 January 2001

Thank you so much, Ambassador, and thank you for this wonderful opportunity to say "Good-bye" to my friends in the African Group and so many other Ambassadors and other friends who have come here today -- and my staff who I think was ordered to come here. I want to thank you, Mr. Ambassador and Ambassador Kpostra, as representative of the President of the OAU, for giving me this opportunity, and I want to also join you in thanking the man you correctly call "the chief," my chief, Arthur Mbanefo, my friend, my chief, for that wonderful reception last night. I cannot think of any other Ambassador in the UN who I would rather have had give the reception than Arthur Mbanefo, a great Ambassador, a great friend, and a representative of a great country. Thank you so much.

This is the only regional group I will speak to and it is true, as Ambassador Juwayeyi, said that it is sort of half our suggestion and half OAU's invitation, but I wanted to speak to Africa because I pledged in my confirmation hearings a year and a half ago that Africa would be our priority. And I wanted to offer you something of a report at the end of the mission on what we've done, what I think we've learned and a few ideas. And I promise that in keeping with my reputation I will make some provocative suggestions during the course of the next few minutes.

I want to begin, however, by thanking you for your friendship, your advice, and your encouragement. Our commitment to our unfinished agenda remains and as a private citizen I will continue to be deeply involved in African affairs and African issues. We have two days left and my last official meeting at the UN will be an open meeting of the Security Council on HIV/AIDS and on peacekeeping, and I hope that many of you will be able to join us. I intend to speak very frankly in that meeting about what I think is a continuing shortfall on the part of the UN and what it is doing to combat AIDS, particularly in its own troops in the peacekeeping field.

So, leaving AIDS aside for the public meeting the day after tomorrow, let me talk about other issues relating to Africa. Let me start by making three simple basic, inter-related points.

Africa matters.

The UN matters.

And the US position in support of both the institution of the UN and in support of Africa has been greatly strengthened in the last two years.

In regard to Africa, specifically, I have often heard the charges of a double standard. I understand where they come from. Let me say clearly that, as far as I am concerned at least, the double standard does not exist.

I came to New York with three major stated priorities: reform of the UN's scale of assessments and reform of the institution as a whole, the Balkans, and Africa. We will discuss the Balkans tomorrow in the Security Council and on the scale of assessments, the parameters of our effort were established by the need to safeguard the UN by achieving essential reforms.

In Africa, however, I needed to learn before I could act and the people in this room and others, especially including our great Secretary General Kofi Annan, were among my best teachers. You introduced me to the complexities of your countries, taught me to differentiate between the individual characteristics of countries which too few people in America know on an individual basis. And you promised me that if I made a sustained effort you would support me.

When I announced that my first major trip would be to Africa - although there were two short prior trips, one to East Timor and one to the Balkans - you correctly came to me and said -- when I announced first that it would be a "learn and listen trip"-- the Ambassadors from SADC came to me and said that's not good enough. I can't just go to learn and listen I have to go to do something. You were right and I agreed on the spot to change the type of mission. I was concerned that if I went on an action trip before I knew anything about the area you - the Ambassadors in the room- would say it was American arrogance. So I was trying to go as a student first but when you told me to go first as an activist, I listened to you and I did what you told me to do, which was not to go merely to listen, which is what I had done in other parts of the world. You opened doors throughout the African continent and we went to ten countries on that first trip, Kati and myself. And I'm deeply grateful for your hospitality and I apologize to those countries that asked me to come and to which I have yet had the occasion to visit. You brought me face-to-face with the individual crises and challenges that you deal with on a daily basis and finally you made clear the faith and hope that the African people put into the United Nations and the United States.

Our first stop was Mali and our second stop was Angola. The contrast could not have been more clear. In Mali, where I was greeted by my friend Moctar Ouane and his president, President Konare, we saw a thriving political structure -- despite poverty -- and admirable progress. But in Angola, one of the most difficult situations I have ever seen, perhaps the worst country I have ever been in in terms of the situation of the people I saw what you're all familiar with -- a country at war with itself since 1961 despite three major peace processes, five UN operations and billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, people who continue to suffer, the highest infant mortality rate in the world and all this in a country that supplies our country with 7 per cent of its oil per day and which receives billions of dollars in foreign revenue.

As the Bishops of Angola noted in their pastoral letter, it is the people who suffer when oil and diamonds fuel a conflict over power. Superpowers have turned that beautiful country into a Cold War battleground and with the end of the Cold War and an overdue and belated but welcome shift in American policy away from playing games with Savimbi the situation had the opportunity to improve but it's still a terrible situation. I saw first hand some of the 2 1/2 million internal refugees in Angola who fall outside the purview of the UNHCR. And it was that trip in Angola, more than anything else, that fueled our non-stop campaign to get the UNCHR to take on responsibilities for internal refugees, so-called IDPs, and I urge you, my friends in this room, not to let go of this issue. I've talked to the new head of the UNHCR, Prime Minister Lubbers about this. He is seized with the issue, Secretary Annan is seized with the issue but I find it disgraceful that members of other bureaucracies come to me and argue about whose fault it is or whose responsibility it is. Let them get together and designate a lead agency for internal refugees in each country. In most cases it should be the UNHCR, but if it isn't let it be somebody else. Don't just sit in New York and Geneva arguing about it and pointing fingers.

In Angola I saw a corrupt and inefficient government locked in combat with a reprehensible insurgency, neither of whom were putting the interests of the people of Angola first. I met a young journalist named Rafael Marques who had spent 38 days in prison for publishing an article attacking corruption in high places. I met a priest who had been tortured by the colonial secret service but who had nonetheless dedicated the rest of his life to the cause of social justice. And I met men and women of goodwill, from inside the government and in civil society, who wanted to work together for just and lasting peace.

Angola embodies the huge problems and the vast potential of your great continent and I think that it must not be forgotten. It is remarkable to me, given the dimensions of the problem in Angola, how often people, in outlining the world's problems, go through fifty problems and don't even mention Angola whose people have suffered as long, if not longer, than any other nation on earth.

From that trip, and the other eight countries that I visited, emerged many themes. The theme of concentrating on HIV/AIDS, the decision to devote January of last year to Africa when the US was in the Security Council Presidency, and many other things. In announcing January of last year, the first month of the new Millennium, as the "Month of Africa, we said we thought it would be the "Year of Africa" at the UN, and so it was. We spent time in Africa and while I would not pretend to you we solved its problems -- I'll get to that in a moment -- I think it can be said we kept the faith, we kept Africa on the front burner.

In the process, we expanded the traditional scope of the Security Council deliberations in an historic manner. When Vice President Gore, exactly a year ago, presided over the first health discussion in the history of the Security Council -- over vehement objections from many traditionalists, including some from my own staff -- we made and won the argument that the narrow definitions of security from 1945 no longer work in the modern world. I firmly believe - and I know that I have overwhelming support from my African friends here - that the UN cannot function as a series of islands with jurisdictional battles and turf battles. We need to work together and it was your support - the African members of the UN - Tunisia, Mali, Namibia, and your friends, Jamaica, among others, that convinced some of the more traditional countries on

the Security Council- particularly Russia and China- that they should have a health issue discussed and the meeting Friday will be the third meeting on health and as you all know we now have a Security Council Resolution on the issue too.

We recognize that Africans want a responsive, multi-disciplinary, and relevant Security Council. The states of Africa are the UN's most loyal and most demanding members. Your loyalty is justified. Your demands are also justified. We - the United States and you -the African Group- share within that framework several major policy goals. First, we must share the goal of making UN peacekeeping successful. This means well planned operations on the basis of realistic mandates. It means better trained, better equipped and better prepared contingents. It means a DPKO operation that is more responsive to the troop contributing countries. I am deeply distressed that the ACABQ killed the third Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping. I am puzzled by this because not only was it called for in the Brahimi Report, which all Chiefs of State had endorsed at the Millennium Summit, but because the ACABQ killed the Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping who was going to be from the troop contributing countries. I don't understand that. And some of the troop contributing countries, representatives in the ACABQ, pretending they were independent experts, which I assure you, they're not, voted against something in the interests of the troop contributing countries. So, we have Mr. Annabi, who we all respect and we have an American Mike Sheehan, who I hope you all get to know who is a superb American official who will help with Congress, But the third ASG was going to be from the troop contributing countries not from a member of the P-5 and not from a Security Council member necessarily. And I beg you get that third ASG back. You need it.

You can't have an organization which is the UN's defense ministry with only two deputies, and only 450 or 500 people running operations all over the world. You've got to separate military from police, logistics from operations, planning from personnel and you need deputies to do it and I am delighted we have an American deputy in DPKO now under Jean-Marie Guehenno but we need a real troop contributing country represented at the ASG level. So, I hope when I leave, those of you in the African Group will take the lead on doing that when it comes up in May.

Now, we share with you also the goal of expanding UN peacekeeping in Africa. Whether we are talking about the Congo, which I will return to in a minute because of the dramatic event of the last few hours, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, Western Sahara, Angola, the Central African Republic or Somalia, we are sharing a basic belief: The UN needs to be there, in the absence of other forces and it must have the personnel, resources and mandates to be part of the solution. The failures of the past - and we all know who they are and where they are- must not be repeated. And yet they will be unless the UN equips the personnel better, works out clear communications systems, the best communications, and common missions. In Sierra Leone, each country understood its mandate mission differently. The Guineans, the Zambians, the Nigerians, the Indians, and others all had different understandings of their missions. The communications broke down. There were only three people in New York overseeing the operations in Sierra Leone. That cannot be repeated. We must learn from these mistakes. Nothing is more important and it matters more to Africa than anything else. And now that the peacekeeping scale of assessments has been reformed for the first time in history and - and I stress this to those of you who were not with me in Washington

last week to hear the Senate Foreign Relations Committee- now that we believe that the cap on peacekeeping that the US arbitrarily imposed on itself in 1994 - of 25% will be lifted it's time to give peacekeeping more support.

Now, as we speak here, General Powell is in his confirmation hearing. He will be asked this question. Senator Helms and his colleagues have indicated that if the new administration supports the lifting of a cap above 25% they will be responsive. Senator Biden will make that proposal in response to your generosity in taking our assessment down, we're going to rise to meet the gap, I hope, I believe and I will fight for it. But if this happens, take advantage of the opportunity. I beg you. Nothing is more important for the UN and within the UN. No one will be more affected by this than Africa.

Third, we share the goal of an important UN system, more responsive to the needs of its constituents. By constituents, I do not mean the entrenched civil servants in this building or in Geneva - I mean the people who should be on the receiving end of every taxpayer dollar, naira, or pound that is spent by the UN. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must be strengthened and it must be expanded to reflect the reality that it is one of the busiest Ministries of Defense in the world. Under Secretary General Jean-Marie Guehenno who is - as I said a moment ago for all practical purposes - the Minister of Defense or the Minister of Peacekeeping of this great institution, we must help him to be more successful and I beg you again not to let third rank bureaucrats, people who don't even follow the instructions of some of the Ambassadors in this room, go into a closed meeting late at night and gut something as important as the Brahimi Report. He must have the means to carry out the mission and it matters more to Africa than any part of the world although it also matters in East Timor, in Lebanon, in Kosovo, in Bosnia, in Cyprus and elsewhere.

Fourth, we share the goal of bringing HIV/AIDS under control. This means more resources and more candor. We must put this issue at the forefront of our priorities and that's why we will end our efforts on Friday with that issue.

Fifth, we share the goal of development. I do not want to ignore development and I want to stress again to my friends particularly from the Caribbean group and elsewhere outside the peacekeeping area, that the US did not put peacekeeping forward en lieu of development but we increased the amount of money we gave to both issues at the same time. The UN was founded primarily as an organization to prevent the renewal of world conflict. In the narrow sense it has succeeded - we haven't had a world war in 55 years -- but the number of small wars has been enormous and, meanwhile, we have had to focus on an increasing development burden that was unforeseen or unimaginable to the founding fathers of the United Nations.

The UN has no means of addressing another problem which was not envisioned at all by the founding fathers of the UN and that is the problem of the systemic failure of states. This is one of the emerging security challenges, perhaps the emerging security challenge of the 21st century in Africa, the Balkans, and in parts of Asia.

Turning to specific issues, I want to speak briefly about Sierra Leone and the Congo. I regret to say that we end last year and begin this year without being able to say that either

problem has been resolved. The good news from Sierra Leone is that after a real crisis in the spring of last year it is stabilized, but the current situation in Sierra Leone is not an acceptable equilibrium. It's an equilibrium but it's not stable and I can assure you that it will either get a lot worse or it will get better. It will only get better if the UN takes an aggressive leadership role to break through. If we just leave it where it is, sooner or later it will explode.

Now, let me turn briefly to the crisis that is enveloping Kinshasa as we speak. As we enter this room this morning there is great confusion and uncertainty about what is happening in Kinshasa. We have conflicting reports and I will not bother to share with you the latest ones because I know nothing beyond what is available to you publicly. But I do want to make a general comment about the situation in the Congo. Certainly, no issue I've worked on in my 38 years in and out of the government has been as complicated or as difficult as the Congo. There are more players, more actors involved than any other issue, and it is simply indescribably difficult to deal with. Let me be clear on one point. The reported death of President Kabila may change the political landscape, indeed it will change the political landscape, but it will not alter the underlying reality that the Congo must undergo a peaceful democratic transition whether or not President Kabila has survived --and there are conflicting reports on that --the imperatives will remain the same. We must all work aggressively and pro-actively with the Congolese people to bring about a situation where arbitrary rule and division is replaced by inclusive and broad-based governance.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which had been signed before I took this job, has always been a logical starting point for this process, and a rational and intelligent plan and I commend President Chiluba for his leadership in this regard. But let us be frank. Every signatory violated it without exception. If the agreement needs restructuring to be implemented so be it. But every time we talked about the slightest change everyone said "Oh no, you can't change any part of it because then every thing has to be changed" so we stuck to the Lusaka Plan and it wasn't implemented. What did it leave us with? A situation where the Secretary General of the United Nations, under his authority, under the Security Council Resolution, chose not to deploy the full 5,537 troops authorized. I believe that was the correct decision but it is one that many Africans have understandably lamented. Yet, unless the Lusaka signatories implemented their part of the withdrawal and demobilization plan, unless President Kabila and his government implemented the national dialogue how could the Secretary General send UN peacekeepers into an untenable situation where their lives would be at risk and where the UN has lost more people in peacekeeping than any other country in the world in the last 40 years. So, either the Lusaka Agreement has to be implemented or it has to be restructured. Whatever the situation in Kinshasa, the national dialogue must be revitalized. It is essential that the foreign forces who occupy large parts of the Congo halt their offensive action. They should not seek to take advantage of the events in Kinshasa to expand their presence. They should not play a role in the internal political process in Kinshasa. To these Congolese who took up arms we need to insure that they have a place at the table as well along side their countrymen who chose unarmed opposition.

The crisis in West Africa, I want to now turn to is also noteworthy. First of all Guinea was once a French colony, Sierra Leone a British colony and Liberia, as you all know, had a special relationship with the United States going back to its founding. Now all three are in

terrible shape and none of the so-called great powers of the last century should look back on pride on the roles that we have played there. Nonetheless we must deal with realities as they go forward even after examining their historical roots and that is equally true I might add of the Congo. Until the governments of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea can rule in the name of their people and in the interest of their people, armed insurrection seems inevitable. A third note-worthy aspect of the crisis in West Africa is the break down of the African tradition against military intervention in neighboring states. I can recall how the late great President Nyerere agonized over the decision to overthrow the brutal regime of Idi Amin in Uganda, how his firm belief in the rules of the OAU conflicted with his moral outrage at the excesses of that government. Ultimately, he intervened for moral reasons but only with the greatest reluctance. But today, as we look at the world and we look at Africa, we see that some African leaders practice intervention with limited restraint and invariably for wrong reasons, selfish reasons, reasons of personal gain or financial gain for themselves and their cronies while leaving corrupt and odious leaders in place.

Fourth, the international community must give all sides to these conflicts the opportunity to accept negotiated settlements, but if one side conclusively proves its bad faith, we must ask the UN to break out of impartiality. This was, incidentally, what happened in Bosnia. The UN appeared to be neutral between the oppressed and the oppressors, the aggressors and the victims of aggression much too long. The UN's failure in Bosnia was so complete that the United States had to lead a NATO intervention and push the UN aside in order to bring peace to Bosnia. I regret what happened although I played a central role in it and I did not regret that. I was the person who told the UN they could not send a representative to Dayton for the negotiations and I didn't like to do it because I love the UN as an institution and respect it. But they had blown their chance. Let us be honest about the situation in places like Sierra Leone. Let us be honest that if one side if the primary cause of the problem that we have to let the UN show its feelings.

In that regard, I am very pleased that recent resolutions last year on diamonds and other issues that put pressures on the countries we feel are most responsible for the situation. In Sierra Leone what we have is a fragile but democratically elected government trying to, against considerable odds, deal with one of the world's most repugnant insurgencies, the RUF. It's backed by a once proud and law-abiding member of the international community, a founder of the OAU. We're distressed that the present government there has abandoned these ideals. And we're distressed but we see no alternative but to put more pressure on the leadership which like Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia has been the primary cause of this issue.

Let me now turn away from the crises in Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone to more general perspectives about the last 18 months in Africa.

President Rawlings of Ghana recently reminded us as he oversaw a wonderful and democratic election which has inspired the world that Africa needs to hear more speeches from leaders who voluntarily give up power. We have heard these worlds from many presidents in Africa -- Presidents Senghor and Diouf of Senegal, President Kaunda of Zambia, Presidents Nyerere and Mwinyi of Tanzania, President Masire of Botswana, and of course, from the revered President Mandela of South Africa. But still, such speeches are not universal in Africa and other

parts of the world. And I hope we can see the day when it won't be exceptional to note a peaceful, democratic transition as the one that has been so rightly praised in Ghana.

Let me deal now with the difficult question of why some African governments and the international community have not served the interests of the people of Africa as well as they might. This is a most difficult issue because all of you in this room, whether you agree with what I'm saying or not, care deeply about your countries and about the continent of Africa. But we must be honest that we can do better for the people of Africa.

One of the things I hear a lot here in the UN is the phrase, "African solutions for African problems." I myself use this phrase regularly in regard to issues like the Lusaka agreement. But sometimes, whatever its intent and meaning in Africa, sometimes the same phrase – African solutions for African problems -- is used by westerners as an excuse for inaction. They translate it as, "these are African problems so let the Africans fix them." I reject that firmly. We the outside world have a deep obligation and commitment to work with the leadership of Africa to deal with these issues. To me the phrase, "African solutions for African problems," means that we would never again see something like the Berlin conference of 1884 where foreigners carved up Africa for their own ends. But it also means that the Pan-African ideal will never be realized if it is based on African isolationism.

I believe that "African solutions for African problems" should mean that the international community will assist Africans who take leadership roles in continental issues. We have many examples of that: President Wade of Senegal, President Konare of Mali, President Chiluba of Zambia, President Chissano of Mozambique, President Bouteflika of Algeria, President Guelleh of Djibouti, President Mbeki of South Africa, President Bongo of Gabon, and President Obasanjo of Nigeria. And I tell you how deeply proud I am that I have come to know some -- most of these leaders -- as individuals and as friends. It is one of the great, great moments of my life to get to know people like President Konare, President Obasanjo, President Mbeki, President Masire, President Chissano and other of your great leaders, statesmen of world class, who lead Africa and should be a symbol to other countries.

But "African solutions for African problems," should not mean "give us your money but spare us your advice." It should mean partnership and interdependence as Africa integrates into the world system. I do not believe that Africa is different. I kept being told here before I came, particularly by African experts, that Africa was unique and different. But luckily I had worked in Asia and Europe and I'd been told that Asia was different and unique and Europe was different and unique before I got to Africa. Of course, every country is unique, every individual is unique. But the problems are not unique. I surprised my African friends when I told them this after our Security Council trip in May of last year. But when I told them that everything we were confronting in the Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea and other parts of Africa was similar and in some cases structurally identical to problems we had faced in Europe and Asia, that wasn't a sign of disrespect. It was a sign that there are universal problems with individual and local characteristics and they must be dealt with that way.

The barriers for Africa's evolution need to be addressed frankly. If Africa and the OAU and its other organizations, like ECOWAS and SADC -- two organizations with which I've had

very close relations -- are going to take their place alongside the European Union, ASEAN, the OAS, NAFTA and other regional groups. And I believe this is possible and I believe it should be the goal for Africa.

Let me be somewhat provocative and quite honest with you. I don't think that Africa and its great people have been fully served by some of its leaders and institutions adequately. The OAU is a great institution with a great and storied history. And I have great respect and affection for my friend Salim Salim, your Secretary General. But as an organization, the Organization of African Unity, has sometimes in recent years been less than the sum of its parts. When liberation was the agenda item, the OAU was unified and made an absolutely critical and historical contribution to history. The architects of decolonization are all closely identified with the OAU, great names like Nyerere, Nasser, Nkrumah, Toure, Ben-Bella and Khama. However, if the ideology of the liberation era remains the driving force behind the OAU, as we are now in the second year of the new century, then the institution will simply become a museum of the history of African nationalism.

Now the OAU took an historic step when it decided not to seat governments that come to power via unconstitutional means. This already has had a positive impact on the situations in Cote D'Ivoire and Comoros. Could the OAU expand this to include governments that retain power by unconstitutional means, or which violate international sanctions on diamonds, or which forment civil war in their neighborhood? Rather than leaving unchallenged the prerogatives of governments to do whatever they please within their own countries, the OAU might consider taking the lead in promoting economic and political integration.

When Africa is united behind these ideals – ideals you articulate in all your declarations -- the unity is a potent force for a regional agenda. However, when Africa decides to unite in refusal to criticize one of its own, or when it automatically assumes that its agenda is indistinguishable from the Non-Aligned Movement or the G-77, unity can become an impediment. Unity can become a lowest-common-denominator façade that prevents achievement. I believe that one of the African group's great challenges as it emerges onto the world stage as a major force – and you are now a major force on the world stage – is to redefine the use of unity into an instrument for promoting and defending common democratic values.

Now, I know you would be very disappointed if I left you without one truly provocative idea so here it is. After 18 months as the American Ambassador to the United Nations I have reached a conclusion which I will share with you today, which I know will be controversial. I don't expect you to agree with it, and even if you agree with it I don't expect you to be able to say so freely in public at this point. But I hope you will debate and think about it over the coming year. And I put it to you in the framework of mutual respect among friends – and as I look around this room, I see many, many friends.

I respectfully ask the African countries here today to reconsider their association with the Non-Aligned Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement is not Africa's friend at this point. Your goals and the NAM's are not synonymous. Now, this issue has been skillfully, indeed brilliantly, modulated by the fact that in the current cycle the Non-Aligned Movement's Chairman is also the Ambassador from South Africa, my very good friend Dumisani Kumalo. And Dumisani has

done a brilliant job of modulating the issue, but on issue after issue, the NAM is operating not on behalf of Africa but on behalf of other extraneous issues. And Africa is being pulled through NAM solidarity into supporting positions which are not in Africa's interests. And it is an historical anomaly.

Now the NAM shares some of the same founders as the OAU. And all of you are familiar with its origins in Bandung in 1955 out of a storied and different era at the height of the cold war with men like Chou En Lai and Tito and Sukarno and Nkrumah and Nasser. But this is 2001 and I have not seen a single issue in which the NAM positions actually benefited the African group. You weaken your voice as the OAU, as the African group, by associating with a group that is dominated by non-African radicals with one or two African members, which doesn't represent the interests of your people, which is obsessed with other issues. The G-77 is somewhat different because the G-77 focuses on economic issues. I had my difficulties with the G-77 because some of the members of it were hardly developing nations and therefore the battle over scale of assessments in which the G-77 took the lead was often very peculiar because the G-77 position was being driven by its richest members not at the benefit of the poor members. But I understand the value of the G-77 because the resource transfer issue is a legitimate and important issue and it's one on which your efforts should not waver.

But the Non-Aligned Movement, in my view, should either cease to exist as a separate caucus, merge with the G-77 or else, you and the African group – and I recognize that this is an issue for much higher levels than most of us in this room – should consider distancing yourself from the NAM. So that you can protect African interests and not allow yourselves to be pushed by less than 10 radicalized states into positions that you don't need. Now every country in this room is a member of both groups and I know that I'm making a suggestion that is potent with meaning and history. But I'm leaving in three days and I want to give you something to argue about.

All of you who have worked with me know that the history of the last 17 months, my tenure is that I've repeatedly put forward positions that people found either offensive or provocative at the beginning, but after we've talked about them for month after month, and thought about them, we reached acceptable compromises. If I were staying here for another year, I would make the same proposal but in a quieter way. And then I'd talk to all of you until we found out whether it was feasible or not but since I can't do that I just want to let you think about it. Because your responsibility—and here I talk only to my friends from Africa, not to the non-African Ambassadors here in the room, although I see many of my closest non-African Ambassadors here—you should consider the way the other associations, and particularly the NAM, weakens your central agenda. This is your institution. Africa is the dominant force in the UN when you want it to be. So think of Africa and don't get used for other issues in other parts of the world, which are other people's battles, which are left over from the fight against colonialism, or the Cold War, or some residual radicalism left over in a few anachronistic countries.

And again, in saying all this, I want to pay tribute to Ambassador Kumalo, whose stewardship of the NAM has made this issue one which we can deal with. Had it been done differently, it could have been an even more difficult situation.

So let me conclude. I believe that Africa's security, its welfare and its freedom are ultimately as important to all of us as they are to Africa itself. The visionaries who founded the UN were people who rose above traditional thoughts of national interest and national security. They recognized that security and prosperity were global and could not exist in isolation. The representatives of the African states here in New York have always known that individually it was difficult to make their voices heard except perhaps for the four largest countries in Africa who will always get a hearing, but for the smaller countries, a collective voice was essential and the more collective it is, the more effective. In my time here at the UN, you've afforded me the singular honor of speaking to you both as individuals and as a group, and increasingly as a friend. In both cases, your message is one of faith in the UN, hope for the role of the United States, and urgency on behalf of your people.

Speaking individually, I want to assure you that I heard your message and I will continue to listen to it as I go back into private life. I intend to remain actively engaged in African issues and I look forward to a continued dialogue with any of you who wish to maintain it. I hope to continue to travel to Africa and build on the wonderful friendships that Kati and I have made within the African group among all of you as individual ambassadors and among the broader constituency of Americans who care about Africa. I hope that you will continue to think of me as part of the global constituency fighting for the priority of Africa—which is why I am speaking only to the African group and not to the other regional groups as I leave this job -- one of the growing number of Americans who understand the importance of Africa and who care about the continent, its problems and above all, its people. And above all, I hope you will continue to regard me as your friend.

Thank you very much.

United Nations A/55/742–S/2001/71

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Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 164
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 23 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to two recent acts of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israeli civilians.

On 17 January 2000, Israeli soldiers discovered the bullet-riddled body of Ofir Rahum, a 16-year-old Israeli youth from the city of Ashkelon. This heinous and premeditated murder was conceived and implemented over an extended period of time. Several weeks prior to his murder, Rahum befriended a young Palestinian woman, Amna Mona Jawad, after corresponding with her over the Internet. Jawad posed as an American tourist in order to lure Rahum from his home in Ashkelon to Jerusalem for a meeting. Jawad then drove the innocent teenager to a pre-arranged location near El-Bireh, on the outskirts of the Palestinian-controlled town of Ramallah. Upon reaching the designated spot, Jawad exited the vehicle in which they had been travelling, another vehicle approached, and three members of the Tanzim paramilitary group shot Rahum more than 15 times, mutilating his body beyond recognition. Rahum's body was then dumped in another location where it was subsequently found.

This cruel and cold-blooded murder of a blameless 16-year-old boy by Palestinian gunmen comes just days after the murder of another Israeli civilian, Ronni Tsalah, who was killed by terrorists near his home in Kfar Yam. Soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces discovered Tsalah's body on 15 January after having been informed by his family of his abduction. The remains of Tsalah's car, which had been burned and wrecked by a Palestinian mob, were later found in the Palestinian-controlled town of Khan Yunis.

It must be stressed that, as Israel works to maintain security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and to contain violence directed against Israeli soldiers and civilians, terror attacks and other violent provocations continue. The murders of Ofir Rahum and Ronni Tsalah come amid a continuing wave of Palestinian violence and terrorism which I have detailed in a number of letters, most recently of 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114) and 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108).

01-22410 (E) 230101

As these letters have shown, many terrorist attacks have been carried out by members of the Tanzim, the paramilitary wing of Chairman Arafat's own Fatah faction. Despite signed agreements reached with Israel, the Palestinian leadership has failed to disarm the Tanzim, members of which carried out the reprehensible attack of 20 November 2000 on a bus-load of Israeli schoolchildren. The freedom of action that the Tanzim and other terrorist groups enjoy in the territories under control of the Palestinian Authority has directly led to the violence and terrorism we are now experiencing.

Moreover, these murders illustrate, yet again, that the current unrest is hardly a popular civilian uprising, but rather a calculated campaign waged not only by civilians, but by violent terrorist cells and armed militias, inspired by the Palestinian leadership and encouraged by their official media outlets.

Israel reiterates its call upon the Palestinian Authority to abide by its commitments to put an end to terrorist activity and other forms of violence emanating from the territory under its control.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 164, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yehuda **Lancry**
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/55/743

General Assembly

Distr.: General
24 January 2001

Original: English

Fifty-fifth session
Agenda item 42
Special session of the General Assembly in 2001 for follow-up to the World Summit for Children

Letter dated 22 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith the Kingston Consensus, which was endorsed by the Ministers and Representatives of the 35 Governments that participated in the fifth Ministerial Meeting on Children and Social Policy in the Americas, held in Kingston from 9 to 13 October 2000 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 42.

(*Signed*) M. Patricia **Durrant**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

01-22642 (E) 290101

Annex to the letter dated 22 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Spanish]



PREAMBLE

The Ministers and Representatives of Governments participating in the Fifth Ministerial Meeting on Children and Social Policy in the Americas held in Kingston, Jamaica on 9-13 October, 2000 present the results of the deliberations and recommendations endorsed by consensus:

CONSIDERING THAT

1. These Ministerial Meetings are an effective mechanism for monitoring and evaluation, including the analysis of obstacles as well as sharing experiences on the progress in the implementation of the World Summit Children goals, as well as for defining policy directives and strategic orientations. As such, they are also important mechanisms for advocacy to keep children and adolescents high on the political and social agenda of the region and of each country. The goal of the Kingston Consensus is to call on States parties to focus on what can be done from the year 2000 to accelerate progress towards the full implementation of World Summit Goals, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Lima Accord and the developing of a future agenda.

2. Since 1990, change, planned and unplanned, has proceeded at a fast rate and interpretations of the social processes behind the change are likewise evolving. Social, economic and political conditions affecting children and adolescents and paradigms created to explain them are, at the end of the decade, quite different. The region recognizes the urgent need to resolve key survival issues while it continues the change from a central focus on survival to one oriented towards protection, promotion and the assurance of one's right to participation and integral development.

3. The states of the region have recognized the value of human rights through the ratification of Conventions and the

endorsement of plans of action and recommendations emanating from different global and regional conferences. However, the complete fulfillment of human rights continues to be challenged both within the region and within countries.

4. In certain countries, due to the implementation of particular developmental strategies, programmes of structural adjustment, the process of globalization and unresolved issues regarding inequitable market access, social and cultural variables have been under-emphasized thus deepening inequities and exclusion in favour of economic growth. Consequently, social investment, although increasing, remains insufficient. Similarly, the reduction of Official Development Assistance has negatively impacted on economic and social development in some countries of the region.

5. Children and adolescents are often excluded from participating in economic, political, and social processes, which thereby hinders their own development and deprives society of their insights, commitment, and energy.

6. The situation of children, adolescents and women of the region has improved in remarkable ways since 1990, as indicated by, among others, the following accomplishments:

   A. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women have been ratified by the overwhelming majority of countries of the Americas;

   B. Infant and under five mortality rates have been reduced by over 20% in most countries;

   C. Vaccination rates are over 90% for the major immunizable diseases.

   D. Poliomyelitis has been eradicated and mortality due to measles has been significantly reduced.

E. Net primary school enrolment is over 90%.

F. Sanitation coverage has increased considerably, particularly in rural areas.

G. All countries have made progress in salt iodization and most have improved the fortification of foods with iron and vitamin A.

H. Improvements in protein and caloric intake have resulted in a marked reduction in childhood malnutrition.

I. Some progress was made towards gender equity and equality for women. However, their political and economic participation remain too low.

7. In spite of such progress, all countries in the Americas are concerned with the following issues: (a) the unmet goals of the World Summit for Children; (b) sustaining advances that were made; (c) reducing inequalities; and (d) addressing emerging challenges, inter alia (i) absence of indicators to assess the fulfillment of child rights; (ii) lack of access to quality health services and health information; (iii) the exploitation of children in all forms; and (iv) the need to integrate children in decision making processes.

8. Children and adolescents face barriers to their full participation, protection, development and survival, and the full enjoyment of their rights. These barriers contravene the principle of non-discrimination, which calls for ensuring rights irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, color, sec, age, language, culture, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. Further, that the progress that has been made can be stalled or reversed by armed conflicts, natural and other disasters, new and resurgent diseases, unequal income and power distribution and other threats.

9. In spite of significant progress in implementing social policies and programmes in favor of children and adolescents, there are still weaknesses in areas related to support for families, community organizations, the administration of juvenile justice, health and family life education, cultural expressions, and recreation, among others. Further that weaknesses in these policies, if not corrected, increase the risk for millions of children and adolescents to suffer exclusion, violence, impoverishment and despair.

ARE DETERMINDED TO:

1. Make every necessary effort so that children and adolescents have opportunities to fully develop their physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social capacities and to guarantee and promote respect for human rights.

2. Develop and implement integrated policies and actions aimed at breaking the inter-generational cycles of poverty, and eradicating exclusion, discrimination and lack of respect for human rights.

3. Promote actions and mechanisms to maximize the participation of children and adolescents in decision-making in all matters that directly and indirectly affect them.

4. Support the creation of mechanisms that facilitate the participation of civil society in all matters that affect children and adolescents.

5. Reaffirm Paragraph 10 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which identifies the importance of the Right to development, affirms the human person as the central subject of development and emphasizes the connection to the maximum survival and development of the child.

6. Promote actions to eliminate discrimination and exclusion of ethnic groups, religious groups, linguistic or other minorities or indigenous peoples, and to strengthen their diverse cultural identities.

7. Ensure the protection of children and adolescents from all forms of abuse, including injury, violence, neglect, sexual abuse, commercial exploitation, sale and traffic, forced labor, and from forced or compulsory recruitment for armed conflicts. Further, to ensure such protection through combined strategies of support, including institutional and legal reform, information dissemination, rights awareness promotion, formation of community support groups and family life education, with special emphasis on the role of the father.

8. Ensure the protection of children and adolescents from all forms of discrimination and harm, and support policies, plans and programmes to advance equality and respect for them.

9. Ensure that every child and adolescent in conflict with the law has due process and is treated in accordance with the relevant principles and provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international and national legal instruments and standards for child protection. Further, to take such steps as are needed to provide training in human rights and in the administration of justice for children and adolescents, to all those involved with children and adolescents in conflict with the law.

10. Ensure the rights of children and adolescents with different abilities, including those with disabilities, to appropriate services, attention, and education adequate to their capacities. Similarly, to create mechanisms to support their families and/or caregivers and their full integration into the society.

11. Encourage the partnership between Governments and civil society to assist children and adolescents to develop values that

promote human rights and equality, peace, tolerance, justice, solidarity and positive gender relations.

12. Continue progress towards universal access to comprehensive health services, including effective prevention, early intervention, and treatment and rehabilitation strategies. Also, increase knowledge of adolescents and children about sexual and reproductive health, with special emphasis on HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.

13. Progress toward universal high quality early childhood and primary education in an environment that promotes the full development of children and adolescents, instills respect for human rights, and prepares them for responsible life in society.

14. Increase resources, based on availability, for comprehensive early childhood care and development to ensure better learning outcomes, reduce inequalities, and ensure fulfillment of human rights. Cooperate with civil society and families to support proper health, nutrition, and education.

15. Develop and implement programmes geared to creating opportunities for children, adolescents, and adults who have not benefit from formal education or have dropped out of school. Special attention should be given to disadvantaged children and adolescents, such as those with disabilities, those living with and affected by HIV/AIDS, adolescent mothers, and those in conflict with the law.

16. Urge all countries to consider signing, ratifying and implementing all international legal instruments relating to the rights of children, in particular, (i) the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict; and (ii) the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Pornography and Child Prostitution and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, ILO Convention 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in

Respect of Inter-Country Adoption. These legal instruments represent major advances in the international effort to strengthen and enforce legal norms and national plans of action for the protection of the most vulnerable children.

17. Call on donor and creditor countries and international financial institutions to consider accelerating the adoption of concrete ways to relieve the public debt burden. This should permit the adoption of actions to benefit children and adolescents.

18. Reaffirm the implementation of the 20/20 initiative, addressed at Copenhagen +5 in July 2000, based on mutual agreement and commitment between the donor and recipient countries to ensure universal access to social services.

19. Increase horizontal technical cooperation between countries in order to share positive experiences and strategies, which can help to accelerate the processes necessary for achieving the agreed goals.

20. Institute and consolidate harmonized national and regional information systems, which provide disaggregated data on the situation of children and adolescents in order to enhance decision-making, define and evaluate policies, and inform the populace.

21. Encourage Governments to work towards the full implementation of the commitments made at the World Conference on Human Rights 1993, the International Conference on population and Development 1994, and ICPD +5, the World Summit on Social Development 1995 and WSSD+5, The Fourth World Conference on Women 1995 and Beijing+5, World Conference on Education 1990 and World Education Forum 2000.

22. Recognize that equitable sustainable human development could be facilitated if the rights and well being of children are promoted and protected. The individual development of

children is intrinsically connected to the development of the human society, thus shaping the future of the world.

23. Respond to the unexpected challenges, which will arise, that this Consensus does not address. In all such cases, decisions will be based on the principles of non-discrimination, best interests of the child, maximum survival and development, and participation of children and adolescents.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS:

1. Request that the Host of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting on Children and Social Policy submit the Kingston Consensus as a regional contribution to the Preparatory Committee for the UN Special Session on Children through its Secretariat, and to the Preparatory Committee of the Third Summit of the Americas in 2001.

2. Express gratitude to the Countries of the Caribbean, and in particular to the Government of Jamaica, for hosting this meeting, and especially to the Right Honorable P.J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica.

3. Express their thanks to the Government of Peru as the Pro-Tempore Secretariat for its invaluable contributions to the preparatory process for the Fifth Ministerial Meeting.

4. Express their gratitude to UNICEF, all other UN Agencies, organizations of the Inter-American System and international cooperation agencies, and other members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee, for their facilitation of the Fifth Ministerial Meeting.

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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the address of the President of Ukraine, H.E. Mr. Leonid Kuchma, delivered on 15 December 2000 on the occasion of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant closure (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 20 (b).

Valeriy **Kuchinsky**
Ambassador
Acting Permanent Representative

01-22669 (E) 300101

Annex to the letter dated 8 January 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Address of the President of Ukraine, H.E. Mr. Leonid Kuchma, on the occasion of the Chornobyl nuclear power station closure, delivered on 15 December 2000

I address the Ukrainian people, heads of State, Governments and Parliaments of foreign countries and the whole world community in connection with the event that has a milestone significance for mankind, for everyone who lives and will live on our Earth. Today, on 15 December 2000, 2000 years after the birth of Christ, I issued an order to shut down the third power unit, which is the last of those functioning at the Chornobyl nuclear power station. This means the closure of the facility that made history as a massive and horrible catastrophe.

Fifteen years have passed since the day when a fire at the wrecked nuclear reactor initiated a new phase of civilization, the "post-Chornobyl" era. Since 26 April 1986, the name of this small town in Polissya has lost its original, geographical meaning and obtained a global political and ecological meaning. It has joined the symbolic list of tremendous and devastating cataclysms that entered history as the distinctive marks of their epochs, such as Pompeii, Hernic and Hiroshima. The words "Chornobyl nuclear power station" personify a new phenomenon — nuclear energy out of control, the practical materialization of threatening warnings, which nature has sent many times to people to try and prevent their frivolous, thoughtless and felonious treatment of themselves.

For Ukraine, the act of the decommissioning of the Chornobyl nuclear power station is, without exaggeration, from many points of view an event of epochal importance. In so doing, we are first paying a tribute to the memory of those who died of the diseases caused by this catastrophe while eliminating the consequences of the disaster. Second, we confirm once more that we are fully committed to our obligations to the world. Third, we are finally parting with a totalitarian legacy and its tyranny, indifference and cruelty to human beings, society and nature. And fourth, we reiterate our intention to build our future responsibly, guided by our European inclinations as well as concern for the future generations of the Ukrainian people and the whole humanity.

This decision was conceived by the harrowing experience of the previous 15 years. Ukraine has to pay the bills it did not sign and expiate the sins it did not commit. Its citizens were the first to step into the fire and into the invisible but murderous field of radiation with the aim of protecting the whole planet from the disastrous fire at the cost of their own lives. And by their experience they paid the highest price to give mankind the key to solving such unprecedented problems.

What is Chornobyl for Ukraine? It is nearly 3.5 billion people affected by the catastrophe and its consequences. It is almost 10 per cent of the territory affected by direct radiation. It is 160,000 people from 170 localities who had to abandon their homes and move to other places. By quoting these sad statistics, we do not forget about other countries and peoples, on whose lives the most technological catastrophe of the twentieth century has also left its ominous mark.

This is the fate and history that our State has to bear — its Chornobyl Cross — mostly by itself, alone with its own difficulties and trials. The total economic expenses connected with the catastrophe at the Chornobyl station have already reached $130 billion. We have been compelled in addition to divert enormous material and financial resources on the protection of the affected population and rehabilitation of natural environment. Such expenses have on occasion consumed 12 per cent of the state budget, which considerably exceeds budget assignments for science and culture.

I would like all of you to pay attention to this. I would like the following fact to be considered as well. Ukraine is closing its Chornobyl nuclear power plant in conditions when its economy, with an extremely deformed structure and vast power consumption, has just started to recover after a long crisis in difficult fuel and energy conditions and during winter. To these factors the extremely adverse weather conditions must also be added, which in extensive territories have become a kind of natural disaster. Thus, to lose 5 per cent of generating capacities at a minimum means being ready not only for significant additional losses but also for considerable risk. Not to mention that after its closure, the Chornobyl nuclear power plant has been transformed from a manufacturer of electric power to its consumer.

Yet Ukraine is making this step consciously and voluntarily, following the highest priority interests of our people and international community. We realize that Chornobyl is a threat to the entire world, and consequently we are ready to sacrifice a part of the national interests for the sake of global safety. The implementation of the decision on the closure of Chornobyl that was declared in the early 1990s and confirmed five years ago in the Ottawa memorandum is the second unprecedented goodwill act realized by the Ukrainian State. The first was the renunciation of one third of the capacity of its nuclear arsenal. I hope the world appreciates the importance and humanity of such actions, and is also assured of our commitment to addressing nuclear security problems from the sphere of declarations to the level of real practical issues.

I emphasize this with regard to another, probably the most dreadful and tragic Chornobyl consequence. It is the constant fear of the people for their lives and health, for the fate of their children and grandchildren, for the ecology of the lands and forests, seas and rivers, and subterranean waters. The fear that exists regardless of where they live — near the wrecked reactor and contaminated radioactive zone or thousands of kilometres away. An area that is desolated, silent and hostile to all life, located several dozens of kilometres away from the Ukrainian capital, a reality not created by the imagination or a computer projection, which demonstrates what could happen to the planet if people lack reason and caution in their use of the achievements of science and technology.

The Chornobyl fire fighters and liquidators shielded mankind from such a perspective — as their predecessors from Kyiv Rus safeguarded Europe at the dawn of the Renaissance from alien incursions. Today's act, having eliminated the delayed-action nuclear mine in the heart of Europe, is the beginning of relief from the Chornobyl syndrome in Ukraine as well as at the global level. The sword of Damocles that has all those years been hanging above us is passing into non-existence.

At the same time, this dreadful page of modern history cannot be considered to be completely behind us. The fact of the Chornobyl collisions remain, it is only that

they have been transformed into a new dimension. At the start of the twenty-first century and the third millennium, there is a new era awaiting us, a new one in the post-Chornobyl sense as well. Yet, it raises more questions than gives answers to them.

Before us is the long and complicated process of taking the power station out of operation and its transformation into an ecologically secure system above the damaged fourth energy unit. Before us is also the challenge of ensuring the social security of the station's workers, who are being dismissed, and of the members of their families, and of determining and planning the future of Slavutych city, where they all live. Not one of these people, not one family, should be abandoned.

This will entail great expense, which Ukraine at the moment does not have at its disposal. We, as the State that has suffered the most from the Chornobyl catastrophe and its consequences, have the right to rely on the support of the international community. International assistance programmes are of vital importance, as well as human compassion and understanding of the problems we face.

First, the decision to close Chornobyl station has been adopted and implemented under the guarantees of such assistance, above all on the part of the Group of Seven member States. Second, there is a need that is aggravated with each passing day for mankind to unify all efforts to ensure a safe existence in harmony with nature and prevent technological catastrophes on a global or regional scale, and the proliferation of nuclear technologies.

Chornobyl is the most obvious but not the only evidence of that need. The consequences of accidents at civil and military nuclear facilities, chemical and other enterprises do not recognize any state borders. The danger emanating from them is common for all of us, as our living environment is also common. Let us remember that the globalization and other post-industrial realities make the present world still more closely interconnected. Our world does not end at the threshold of our houses and the boundaries of our States. According to one physicist, we have the only copy of the universe, which cannot be experimented with.

Let us remember, after the pattern of great minds, that wisdom is the daughter of experience. And experience testifies that the content and consequences of technological disasters rise above scientific and political and other differences. They demand the employment of all channels of international cooperation, so that nowhere, never and under no circumstances should a man-made disaster occur on our planet. And that, to my mind, is the main lesson of Chornobyl. The lesson is sad, painful and tragic. Nevertheless, we must learn it.

Today, I would like to reiterate the idea discussed during the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, in 1997, the idea of establishing an ecological security council of the United Nations, international ecological court and international ecological bank. I believe the time has come to put this proposal on a practical footing. That would enable us to act together, in a concerted and coordinated manner, to concentrate the costs and resources to assist countries which are not able to cope on their own with the consequences of natural and technological disasters. Ukraine supports the signing of a convention on the creation of an international mechanism of ecological monitoring and control, and the

implementation of a range of other measures which would guarantee healthy and clean living conditions for all people all over the world.

For our part, we are ready to share freely and generously with the international community our unique although very bitter experience gained over the years of coping with the consequences of the Chornobyl catastrophe. We propose that the nuclear power plant, which is being shut down, and the territory adjacent to it be used as a test ground for an international scientific research centre to work on the technologies of nuclear safety improvement, the alleviation and elimination of the consequences of nuclear catastrophes, and environmental rehabilitation.

In shutting down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, we are renouncing our own needs. We do not seek applause but constructive attention and cooperation. We do not ask for charity but for equality, respect and understanding. We are convinced that the solidarity of nations and States and the humanism of contemporary civilization will not leave Ukraine without assistance in this matter. We are grateful in advance to all who will render it.

Mankind faces the future in reflecting on the past. It is the law of the history. The things that have happened cannot be undone, but nothing should be forgotten. Then may the word "Chornobyl" become an instant and severe reminder for the responsibility in the name of coming generations, for all things created by wisdom and done by human hands. Let 15 December 2000 mark for the world a clear acceptance of this responsibility. In the words of the Holy Writ that have come to us from the depths of the ages: "A wise person knows his own way".

In conclusion, I wish to express my confidence and hope that States, peoples and all mankind will have the wisdom, will and responsibility to follow a reasonable and intelligent path free of such ominous landmarks as Chornobyl. May this be so always.